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Cultural complexity and complexity
evolution
Dwight Read1 and Claes Andersson2
Abstract
We review issues stemming from current models regarding the drivers of cultural complexity and cultural evolution. We
disagree with the implication of the treadmill model, based on dual-inheritance theory, that population size is the driver
of cultural complexity. The treadmill model reduces the evolution of artifact complexity, measured by the number of
parts, to the statistical fact that individuals with high skills are more likely to be found in a larger population than in a
smaller population. However, for the treadmill model to operate as claimed, implausibly high skill levels must be
assumed. Contrary to the treadmill model, the risk hypothesis for the complexity of artifacts relates the number of parts
to increased functional efficiency of implements. Empirically, all data on hunter-gatherer artifact complexity support the
risk hypothesis and reject the treadmill model. Still, there are conditions under which increased technological complexity
relates to increased population size, but the dependency does not occur in the manner expressed in the treadmill model.
Instead, it relates to population size when the support system for the technology requires a large population size. If any-
thing, anthropology and ecology suggest that cultural complexity generates high population density rather than the other
way around.
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1. Introduction
In this article, we review some of the issues stemming
from current models relating to the drivers of cultural
complexity and cultural evolution. The issues we raise
are not with the form of the models, but with back-
ground assumptions that have been made regarding
what constitutes cultural complexity and cultural evo-
lution. Additional issues arise through the empirical
evidence advanced to support theoretical models
regarding the evolution of cultural complexity, espe-
cially in small-scale, hunter-gatherer societies.
In particular, we take issue with a family of models
and empirical investigations deriving from the so-called
‘‘treadmill model’’—the name Kline and Boyd (2010)
have given to the mathematical model developed by
Henrich (2004). This model has played a prominent role
in this literature with its provocative implication that
the interaction population size—the census population
of those who reside together plus those with whom they
interact on a regular basis, or what Henrich (2004)
refers to as the effective cultural population size—is the
prime driver of cultural evolution leading to increased
cultural complexity (Henrich, 2004; Powell, Shennan, &
Thomas, 2009; Shennan, 2001). The empirical evidence
said to support this model and its derivatives have been
archeological (e.g. Powell et al., 2009), ethnographic
(e.g. Henrich 2004; Kline and Boyd 2010), and experi-
mental (e.g. Derex, Beugin, Godelle, & Raymond,
2013). Archeological data provide the time depth
required for tracing out the evolutionary pattern of
time-based changes in the properties and features of
human societies, but tend to be limited to the material
remains that preserve through time. Ethnographic
observations made on living groups provide a broader
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Technology, Göteborg, Sweden
Corresponding author:
Dwight Read, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Los
Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90035, USA.
Email: dread@anthro.ucla.edu
spectrum of data, thus allowing for a more complete
and more nuanced account of the cultural repertoire of
a group, but, for the most part, lack the time depth
needed for evolutionary observations. Experimental
data provide the means for examining, under controlled
conditions, the interaction between complexity and
group size—the primary components of the ‘‘treadmill
model’’—by identifying factors that affect the complex-
ity of what a small group can produce.
The issue that arises with empirical evidence
advanced to support the treadmill model is largely one
of interpretation: Do observed properties, and changes
in those properties through time, match the assump-
tions of theoretical models so that concordance
between observed change and model prediction consti-
tute support of the theory underlying the model? What
we will show in this article is that the background
assumptions required for the theoretical models that
claim to establish the interaction population size as a
primary driver of change in cultural complexity, hence
an important driver for cultural evolution, are not sup-
ported by the empirical data brought forward and said
to support the theoretical models. A critical back-
ground assumption shown to be invalid by this discor-
dance is the assumption of the treadmill model that
increase in cultural complexity is driven by increase in
the expected number of highly skilled individuals in a
population as the population size gets larger. Yet,
already with a population size of n = 500, the expected
value for the number of individuals in the 98th percen-
tile for normally distributed skill levels is 10, thus a
hunter-gatherer society of size n = 500 will already be
likely to have several individuals with a high skill level.
The limiting factor for increase in cultural complexity
in hunter-gatherer groups, then, is not, as claimed in
the treadmill model, the likelihood of the absence of
skilled individuals in a hunter-gatherer group due to a
small population size, but whether the payoff in invest-
ing in a culturally more complex system justifies the
cost of so doing.
Two other reasons why the relationship between
empirical data and the treadmill model is problematic
are as follows. First, the treadmill model for increase in
cultural complexity is based on an overly simplistic view
of what actually constitutes complexity vis-à-vis human
culture. What do the empirical tests aimed at validating
the treadmill model really measure and so with what is
a test for correlations with cultural complexity being
made? Second, even granted that the empirical tests are
legitimate, the complexity of implements made by
hunter-gatherer groups does not correlate with the
interaction population size, as claimed in the treadmill
model, but with mobility and food procurement risk
(see Read, 2008). What is actually being measured is
the complexity of individual tools, which reflects invest-
ment in their production, curation, transportation, and
use effectiveness as part of coping with food
procurement risk. This investment is subject to a trade-
off between risk and mobility since material culture
tends to ‘‘entangle’’ those that rely upon it (Hodder,
2012). This trade-off leads to a subdivision of the cul-
tural evolutionary design space of cultural societies con-
sidered as a whole (Taylor, 2010): Do groups invest in
the ability to move to other places where a simpler tech-
nology works (what Binford (1980) refers to as a forager
strategy), or do groups invest in a more complex tech-
nology that permits more intensive usage of the area
where the group is located (what Binford (1980) refers
to as a collector strategy)? This difference in investment
and the predicted difference in the complexity of tech-
nology is precisely what characterizes the way tool com-
plexity relates to risk and mobility for hunter-gatherer
societies (see Figure 13, below). In other words, what is
primarily measured through tool complexity is an indi-
cator of how the complexity of culture is distributed
within cultural systems. While that is an important ques-
tion in and of itself, tool complexity cannot be used as a
direct proxy for overall cultural complexity, as asserted
by the proponents of the treadmill model.
2. Expansion of models of evolution to
include cultural traits
Over the past several decades, mathematical models of
biological evolution have been expanded to include not
only biological traits but also the so-called cultural
traits. In the latter half of the 20th century, researchers
such as Campbell (1960, 1965, 1974), Cavalli-Sforza
and Feldman (1981), and Boyd and Richerson (1985)
realized that, with humans and human societies, trait
transmission involves phenotypic as well as genotypic
traits when the phenotypic trait is not simply the devel-
opmental expression of an individual’s genotype but is,
for example, behavior arising through the neurological
processes of the brain. Boyd and Richerson refer to
phenotypic trait transmission like this as cultural trait
transmission—which unfortunately conceals an impor-
tant distinction between cultural systems and what they
are made of. Cultural transmission occurs through
enculturation, the process by which cultural systems, as
a whole, become part of the cultural identity that a
newborn takes on as he or she develops through being
immersed and raised in an ongoing cultural commu-
nity, much like a newborn takes on a language through
being immersed and raised in an ongoing community
of language speakers. What they refer to as a cultural
trait is more commonly—and specifically—referred to
as a tradition, which may involve beliefs, objects, or
customs that are transmitted through time by being
taught by the members of one generation to the mem-
bers of the next generation (Shils, 1981). Hence, rather
than using their reference to cultural trait transmission,
we will refer instead to a traditional transmission mode.
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A traditional transmission mode for behavior
learned in a social context by observing the actions of
others is today known to be widespread (see, for exam-
ple, Dean, Vale, Laland, Flynn, & Kendal, 2014; Galef,
1992; Galef & Laland, 2005; Laland & Janik, 2006).
Homo, however, came to develop an enigmatic and
extensive cumulative cultural system based on a much-
buttressed version of this traditional transmission of
behavior along with the ideas underlying these
behaviors—including a whole suite of derived cognitive
and psychological adaptations for learning and, not
least, teaching (see, for example, Barrett & Henzi, 2005;
Burdett, Dean, & Ronfard, 2017; Castro & Toro, 2014;
Csibra & Gergely, 2011; Gaärdenfors & Hoägberg,
2017 ; Kline, 2015).
The difference in trait transmission between genetic
traits and traditional traits has been implemented in
dual-inheritance theory (DIT; Boyd, 2018; Boyd &
Richerson, 1985). DIT was introduced as a means to
consider the interplay between traditional and genetic
transmission. The unifying idea of DIT is that the dif-
ference between the evolution of cultural and of biologi-
cal features lies mainly in differences between these two
types of transmission, not in the nature of the features.
Most would agree that reproductive fitness is a more
complex matter for a traditionally transmitted trait
than for a genetically transmitted trait. Two aspects in
which this difference is displayed include the mode of
transmission and the generation of variation.
The genetic part of DIT is focused primarily on dif-
ferences arising through vertical transmission. The view
that genetic transmission is inherently and essentially
simple and vertical (see, for example, Sterelny, 2011),
though, is now considerably more nuanced due to dra-
matically improved knowledge of microbial evolution
and is now seen to be more like the transmission of tra-
ditions than was previously realized. It is still true that
the several alternative pathways of transmission that
exist for traditional transmission are qualitatively dif-
ferent from the transmission pathways that are relevant
to biological transmission. Transmission of traditions
comes with potentially different criteria for ‘‘passage,’’
including not only vertical (from parent to offspring)
transmission but also transmission that is horizontal
(between individuals of the same generation) and obli-
que (between individuals of different generations).
Other criteria affecting the fitness of tradition transmis-
sion, but not genetic transmission, include social rela-
tionships that exist among individuals in a group, such
as gregariousness, conformism, and, in humans, a ten-
dency of individuals to use prestigious individuals as
role models (Boyd, 2018; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001).
Trait variation involves development in the broad
sense of how hereditary information is transformed
into functional phenotypic organization with regard to
the environment that contributes to differential fitness.
This has been a neglected factor in evolution in the
Modern Synthesis where the foundations of modern
evolutionary theory that DIT departs from took shape
(e.g. Laubichler & Maienschein, 2007, 2013; Laubichler
& Renn, 2015) and is due, to a large extent, to a lack of
empirical knowledge about these processes until
recently. In the context of cultural evolution, develop-
ment has to do with culture as an integrated system, as
Kroeber (1919) observed with regard to fashion trends:
The reintroduction of the train in 1863, the invention of
the Grecian bend in 1872, may now be looked upon as the
product of the dress styles that preceded them or of other
cultural factors affecting style, more justifiably than they
can be attributed to the talent of a specially gifted mind
and hand. (p. 260; see also Andersson, Törnberg, &
Törnberg, 2014a; D’Errico & Banks, 2013)
Culture as an integrated system is an aspect that DIT—
which is a fundamentally microevolutionary theory—
tends to disregard. For DIT, evolution is where ‘‘one
choses from a pool of variants . and the individual-
level processes of selection determine the success, at the
population-level, of the variants’’ (Acerbi & Mesoudi,
2015, p. 483). The disregard of the integration of cul-
tural systems is reflected in how cultural complexity is
perceived in DIT-related research—which contrasts
both with modern biological debates on the same topic
(e.g. Marcot & McShea, 2007; McShea, 1991, 2000)
and with the anthropological view of culture complex-
ity. (Discussions about macroscopic cultural complex-
ity in the context of cultural evolution—a separate
topic in its own right—include Andersson, 2013, p. 90;
Andersson, Törnberg, & Törnberg, in press; Querbes,
Vaesen, & Houkes, 2014; Read, Lane, & van der
Leeuw, 2009.)
3. Definitions of culture and cultural traits
Defining cultural traits through phenotype transmis-
sion successfully expanded the scope of evolutionary
models beyond the evolutionary consequences of geno-
type transmission. This has made it evident that pheno-
typic trait transmission has evolutionary consequences
that fall outside of the scope of the evolutionary conse-
quences of genotypic trait transmission. The extension
of evolutionary theory to also include trait transmis-
sion has, however, not been achieved without a cost.
The extension of the concept of a trait to include not
only genetically but also traditionally transmitted traits
has reduced culture to simply be that part of an indi-
vidual’s phenotype that is transmitted traditionally
from one individual to another. In this perspective, cul-
tural traits are distinguished from biological traits only
by the mode of transmission and not by what constitu-
tes the domain of culture.
This runs counter to how anthropology has normally
viewed culture, which is as socially implemented
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systems of ideas, world views, beliefs, and the like,
shared by the members of a community or society
(Firth, 1951). The definition of culture given by Edward
Burnett Tylor (1871/1929), a definition that is still fun-
damental to how anthropologists view culture (Avruch,
1998; Ping, 1999), remains central to ethnographic
research and writing (Herbert, 1991):
Culture or Civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic
sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge,
belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities
and habits acquired by man as a member of society. (p. 245,
emphasis added)
For Tylor, culture is composed of two essential
parts: first, what culture is—a ‘‘complex whole’’—and
second, how it is obtained—‘‘acquired by man as a
member of society.’’
It is, however, only the second part of Tylor’s defini-
tion, how culture is obtained, that was taken up by
Boyd and Richerson (1985) as the defining characteris-
tic of what distinguished a cultural trait from a genetic
trait. This puts what constitutes culture in sharp con-
trast with the first part of Tylor’s definition, for culture
as a ‘‘complex whole’’ does not relate to the mode of
transmission, but to integrating together its constituent
parts: ‘‘a culture is more than a fortuitous assemblage
of traits; each culture possesses, in addition to its trait
content, a unique organization in terms of which its
distinct components are significantly related to one
another’’ (Hoijer, 1948, p. 338). This implies that the
nature of ‘‘religious systems, social functions, structures
of kinship, and modes of production meant that the
analysis needed to begin at the level of society or cul-
ture as a whole’’ (Bubandt & Otto, 2010, p. 8), hence
with it comes a focus on what is known in common
and is shared by community members (Ping, 1999).
The word ‘‘complex’’ in the phrase, complex whole,
signals that culture is not a single, indivisible entity in
the sense that the term holism, in anthropological the-
ory, came to be ‘‘geared toward asserting bounded, sta-
tic, homogeneous wholes . [and] prone to be used in
totalizing ways’’ (Bubandt & Otto, 2010, pp. 2, 9).
Thus, the phrase, complex whole, implies that culture is
more than the sum of its individual parts (Wallis, 1930)
by being an integrated whole (Ferraro, 1998) in which
changes in one aspect leads to changes in all other
aspects (Hoijer, 1948). Consequently, evolution of cul-
ture has to do with matters such as change in the inte-
gration of culture, changes in the idea systems
comprising culture that are known to, and shared by,
community members (Leaf & Read, 2012), and changes
in the form of cultural organization (Lane, Maxfield,
Read, & van der Leeuw, 2009). Cultural evolution is
not simply change in the frequency of a cultural trait
measured over a population of individuals.
The word ‘‘complex’’ also suggests that culture is
neither a single whole in the sense of a single system
with numerous parts, each well designed and carefully
linked to each other in the system, yet no one of which
bears a reflection of the whole for which it is a part,
much like the parts of clock do not individually express
the whole, for the clock is seen only in the assembly of
the individual parts. Nor is culture a whole that simply
emerges from the interaction of its individual parts (cf.
Smaldino, 2014; see also Read, 2014b). Were this the
case, change in one part need not have any effect on
other parts or on what emerges, but for culture, as the
linguist Harry Hoijer (1948) points out: ‘‘[c]hanges in
one aspect of a culture must inevitably result, sooner or
later, in changes in all other aspects’’ (p. 338). Thus,
culture, as a ‘‘complex whole,’’ is more than a property
emergent from the interaction of simpler parts and less
than a rigid system of interconnected parts. It is some-
where in between (Andersson, Törnberg, & Törnberg,
2014b ; Andersson et al., in press)—a quality that is
reflected, for example, in language in that the commu-
nicative aspect of language is expressed through speech
formed from language as a complex whole through its
grammar, yet the communicative aspect of language is
also conveyed by individual words.
A classic example of a DIT approach to cultural
phenomena is provided by the argument made by
Durham (1991) for the universal occurrence of incest
taboos forbidding sexual relations between parent and
child or between siblings. According to Durham’s argu-
ment, the genetic component of the incest taboos con-
sists of the biological consequences of inbreeding and
the cultural component is the taboo itself. For the non-
human primates, inbreeding avoidance can arise
through selection for sex-biased philopatry and, at least
for chimpanzees, by biological sons avoiding sexual
copulation with their biological mothers. Presumably,
with the increase in the age of sexual maturity during
hominin evolution leading to Homo sapiens, inbreeding
avoidance alone was not sufficient for inbreeding
avoidance (Turner & Maryanski, 2009). From a cul-
tural perspective, Durham argues that the evolutionary
transition from hominins to Homo sapiens includes the
formation of the brain functions and language abilities
that made possible the development of culture and its
social transmission in human societies (p. 155).
Through their observations, he argues, our Homo
sapiens ancestors would have seen the deleterious con-
sequences (but not the mechanism) of inbreeding
depression. Some groups would hit upon the idea of
avoiding the matings associated with deleterious effects,
and some of these groups, he argues, made these mat-
ings taboo. The taboos would have been passed on
through social transmission, leading to cultural group
selection favoring these groups, thereby giving rise to
the universal incest taboos that, according to Durham,
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are neither the consequence of a genetic component
alone nor a cultural component alone.
It should be noted that it is not Durham’s DIT argu-
ment but a non-DIT genetic argument that has been
popularized as the supposed explanation for the incest
taboos. The alternative argument relies on Westermarck’s
(1922) claim that individuals raised together (regardless of
genetic affinity) will abhor having sex with each other.
The incest taboo is then postulated to be the cultural
expression of this abhorrence.
This argument has been heavily criticized on several
grounds. First, El Guindi (2015) notes that
Westermarck references Mundt (1857) to the effect that
‘‘it was not uncommon for French fathers to live in
concubinage with daughters’’ (Westermarck, 1922, p.
200) and that ‘‘the French nature is not repelled to the
same degree as the German by the idea of sexual
unions between persons nearly related by blood’’
(Westermarck, 1922, p. 200), yet Westermarck does not
consider these observations to contradict his claim
about sexual abhorrence since he considers them to be
‘‘quite exceptional’’ (Westermarck, 1922, p. 201).
Second, all of the data that supposedly support
Westermarck’s argument (kibbutzim data (Shepher,
1983), Lebanese cousin marriage data (McCabe, 1983),
and Taiwan minor marriage data (Wolf, 1995)) have
been shown to have more plausible, alternative inter-
pretations (see El Guindi & Read, 2012; Leavitt, 2005,
2007; Read, 2014a; Shor & Simchai, 2009, 2012, among
others), or in the case of brother–sister marriages in
Roman Egypt (Middleton, 1962; Scheidel, 2005), the
data directly contradict Westermarck’s claim. Third, A.
Wolf (personal communication, 25 June 2014), one of
the main proponents for the Westermarck hypothesis
as the basis for incest taboos, now argues that ‘‘incest
avoidance and the incest taboos [are] different things
with different origins’’ (see also Wolf, 2014).
Durham’s DIT argument is also problematic, but
for two different reasons. First, on a more technical
note, he (and others) assume incorrectly that inbreeding
depression is a feature of mating with close biological
relatives rather than the consequence of a shift from
outbreeding to inbreeding (Shields, 1982). Regardless
of the mating pattern, at genetic equilibrium, the rate
of occurrence of deleterious traits due to recessive
alleles is a function of the mutation rate for deleterious
alleles and is independent of the mating pattern (Read,
2014a). Second, he assumes the incest taboo can be
considered in isolation from the larger system of cul-
tural concepts for which it is a part. How the incest
taboo is part of a more encompassing cultural system is
made evident in Lévi-Strauss’ (1969) observation that
[t]he prohibition of incest is where nature transcends itself.
It marks the formation of a new and more complex type of
structure and is superimposed upon the simple structures
of physical life through integration, just as these
themselves are superimposed upon the simpler structures
of animal life. It brings about and is in itself the advent of
a new order. (p. 25)
Lévi-Strauss’ argument may be fleshed out by noting
that the kinship relations making up the kinship sys-
tems that play a central role in all human societies are
derived from an atomic structure formed from the
procreation-based relations of parent-to-child and
sibling-to-sibling and the culturally determined relation
of spouse-to-spouse (Chit Hlaing & Read, 2016) and
referred to as a Family Space by Read, Fischer, and
Chit Hlaing (2014). Critically, the coherency and logical
consistency of the Family Space of primary relations—
hence the coherency and logical consistency of the kin-
ship relations derived from this structure—depend on
making parent–child and sibling–sibling marriages
‘‘unthinkable,’’ a status achieved culturally by making
taboo sexual relations between parent and child and
between sibling and sibling (Read, 2018).
Another crucial aspect of what is meant by culture is
expressed in Ward Goodenough’s (1964) widely refer-
enced observation that
a society’s culture consists of whatever it is one has to
know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable
to its members, and to do so in any role that they accept
for any one of themselves. (p. 36)
Goodenough also brings out, in a different way, the
key point that culture is not the sum of individual traits
since a key aspect of culture is the way it makes possi-
ble the coordinated interplay of individuals within the
social group for which they are members. The coordi-
nated interplay depends on mutual understanding by
group members of what is considered to be proper, or
acceptable, behavior. This means that, from the per-
spective of an individual, the functionality of culture
does not arise through a trait expressed at the individ-
ual level but through an individual’s interaction with
the social group for which the individual is a member:
‘‘Individuals acquire knowledge about . culture by
interacting with one another; . these meanings may be
modified as they interact with others’’ (Greenberg,
1961, p. 10).
A critical example is a kinship terminology com-
posed of kin terms generated from the relations making
up the Family Space. For English speakers, these kin
terms are father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter,
uncle, aunt, husband, wife, and so on. For other
groups, the kin terms differ not only due to a language
difference but also by virtue of kinship ideas expressing
which kin relations are applied to which persons.
English speakers, for example, refer to a man as uncle
when that man is the father’s brother, the mother’s
brother, the father’s sister’s husband, or the mother’s
sister’s husband of the speaker. In many terminologies,
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though, different kin terms are used for these genealo-
gical criteria according to whether the individual in
question is related to the speaker through speaker’s
mother or through speaker’s father; that is, maternal
relatives are identified by different kin terms than
paternal relatives, whereas the maternal/paternal dis-
tinction is not part of the English (and most European)
kinship terminology.
Just as each group member is knowledgeable of the
language that the group uses for communication, each
group member is knowledgeable of the kinship termi-
nology that is part of the cultural repertoire of one’s
group and expresses the kinship relations group mem-
bers have to one another. If, in line with DIT, we were
to consider each kin term to be a cultural trait of an
individual, the problem immediately arises that there is
no functionality that occurs for an individual from indi-
vidually knowing a kin term. For example, suppose an
English speaker decides to use the expression unclemo
for mother’s sister’s husband and unclefa for father’s
sister’s husband. If only the speaker uses these new
terms, they would be meaningless expressions for any-
one else; hence, there is no functionality accruing to this
person through having the equivalent of a mutation in
a trait at the individual level. Of course, neologisms can
be introduced and then spread in the population, but
the manner in which they do so is constrained by the
organization of the language and, semantically, how it
is used. The point is that the fitness of a term is not
inherent to the term itself. The criteria constraining
how the existing structure of kinship terms may change
derives from the way kinship terminologies are logically
structured as a system with a generative logic for the
structure and organization of the kin terms making up
the kinship terminology (discussed in Leaf & Read,
2012; Read, 1984, 2001, 2007b; Read, Fischer, & Chit
Hlaing, 2014, among other references). Thus, a speak-
er’s attempt to use the terms unclemo and unclefa would
be considered incorrect by other users of the English
terminology since these terms are not consistent with
the generative logic of the terminology. Of course, just
as speakers of a language may know that a syntactically
incorrect phrase does not sound correct but cannot
articulate why the phrase is syntactically incorrect,
culture-bearers may know that the mutated kin term is
not valid without being able to express the underlying
logic that makes it an invalid term. For example, for
English speakers, the construction ‘‘cousin-in-law’’ is
syntactically valid, and has for them the meaning
‘‘spouse of speaker’s cousin’’ (or possibly ‘‘cousin of
speaker’s spouse’’), but the English kinship terminology
does not have a kin term whose meaning is ‘‘spouse of
my cousin’’ (Hage, 1997). A Google search on ‘‘cousin-
in-law’’ shows the ambiguity of this candidate for a kin
term. Some English speakers consider cousin-in-law to
be a kin term and others do not.
The underlying logic for why ‘‘cousin-in-law’’ is not
a kin term for English speakers derives from kinship
ideas that are incorporated in the English kinship ter-
minology. One of these is the universal idea of recipro-
city of kin terms: If one person has a kin term relation
to another person, then the latter person has a kin term
relation to the first person. If we consider the relation-
ship of a kinship terminology to its constituent kin
terms to that of a whole to its parts, the reciprocity
property neither occurs at the level of the part nor does
it emerge from properties at the level of the part.
Rather, it is a concept at the level of the whole that then
induces a property at the level of the part. From the
reciprocal property it follows that if cousin-in-law is the
kin term denoting the kinship relation, spouse of cou-
sin, then the reciprocal of the kin term cousin-in-law
must be a kin term in the English kinship terminology
as well. Since spouse of cousin = spouse of grandchild
of grandparent, the reciprocal of cousin-in-law would
be grandchild of grandparent of spouse, but grandpar-
ent of spouse is not a kin term for English culture-
bearers, hence the reciprocal of cousin-in-law would
not be a kin term and so cousin-in-law is not recognized
as a kin term since to do so would violate the recipro-
city principle. Just as languages have a grammar—a
property of the whole—that determines at the level of
the part (the words) what are syntactically correct and
incorrect utterances, the generative logic underlying a
kinship terminology determines what are valid kin
terms for that kinship terminology.
At first glance, the constraints imposed by a gram-
mar for syntactically correct sentences, or the genera-
tive logic of a kinship terminology for what are
logically valid kin terms, appear to be comparable to
the DIT notion of guided variation. Guided variation
refers to the situation where a trait being learned by an
individual is modified and the modified trait is then
transmitted phenotypically to other individuals (Acerbi
& Mesoudi, 2015; Boyd & Richerson, 1985). The modi-
fication of the trait might be interpreted as a constraint
imposed by the learning process, thereby causing some
possible outcomes of the learning process to be more
likely than others. Viewed as imposing a constraint,
guided variation could be said to be analogous to a
grammar or a generative logic with an imposed con-
straint in the form of syntactic correctness or generative
validity, respectively. However, there is a fundamental
difference between guided variance and grammars or
generative logics. With guided variation, there is no
frame of reference for evaluating whether the trait
modified through learning is ‘‘correct’’ in the sense of
whether it fits into, or is consistent with, an integrated
system of parts. In addition, a grammar or a generative
logic is not the source for a modified phrase or kin term
and the selection imposed by the constraint of a gram-
mar or a generative logic relates to whether the phrase
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or kin term will be accepted as a syntactically valid con-
struction, not whether the phrase or kin term will
increase in frequency through phenotypic transmission.
This difference can be seen with the example of the
expression, cousin-in-law. Guided variation would
refer, first, to the person learning the English kinship
terminology who then introduces the expression, cou-
sin-in-law, under the assumption that the -in-law suffix
is used, in general, to denote a kin relation by marriage,
and second, to the spread of the expression, cousin-in-
law, through phenotypic transmission. From the per-
spective of the generative logic of the English kinship
terminology, however, the expression, cousin-in-law, is
rejected as a kin term since it violates the (universal)
reciprocity principle for kin terms. Thus, guided varia-
tion and the generative logic of the English kinship ter-
minology lead to non-comparable outcomes and so
they are not analogous processes.
It is here that Tylor’s notion of a whole comes into
play. The terminology is not simply a collection of kin
terms, each selected in some manner with regard to an
external fitness function (whether genotypic or pheno-
typic in form) but is a conceptual structure with internal
rules regarding both syntactic organization and the gen-
eration of kin terms from primary terms expressing the
relations of the Family Space. How the relations mak-
ing up the Family Space are instantiated by a particular
group gives rise to the various forms that a family may
take on (e.g. two parent heterosexual families, two par-
ent homosexual families, single-parent families, polygy-
nous families, polyandrous families, extended families,
and matrifocal families), depending on the particular
cultural context regarding what constitutes a family.
Changes do occur in cultural idea systems like kin-
ship terminologies, but directionality in changes in cul-
tural idea systems are not determined by the fitness
benefit accruing to the individual with a changed trait,
but by changes in the functionality of the idea system as
a whole in providing, in the case of kinship terminolo-
gies, the conceptual basis upon which members of a
group are conceptually understood by their members to
form a social group and how this relates to the func-
tioning of the group as a social unit. Changes in cultural
idea systems also have developmental consequences
through cascade effects entailed by organizational
change (Andersson et al., 2014a; Lane, 2016; Wimsatt,
2013). For example, American cultural ideas about
marriage have changed from an earlier notion that mar-
riage primarily has to do with family formation and
establishing the responsibility of a man (the groom) for
the well-being of a female and her children, to the pres-
ent notion that marriage provides public acknowledg-
ment of the love one person has for another. This
change has had the cascade effect of legitimizing
same-sex marriages in American law once it was also
accepted that the love emotion, now seen as the basis
for marriage, can occur between individuals of the same
sex (Read, 2017).
For kinship terminologies, rather than functionality
being derived from kin terms viewed as individually
expressed cultural traits, functionality derives from
being part of an ensemble of individuals jointly knowl-
edgeable about kin terms expressing a system of rela-
tions that define for them the kin relations they have to
one another, along with rights and obligations associ-
ated with those kinship relations. These rights and obli-
gations are expressed, according to Meyer Fortes
(1969), through prescriptive altruism:
[K]inship . is associated with rules of conduct whose effi-
cacy comes, in the last resort, from a general principle of
kinship morality that is rooted in the familial domain and
is assumed everywhere to be axiomatically binding. This is
the principle of prescriptive altruism which I have referred
to as the principle of kinship amity . Kinship predicates
the axiom of amity . [and] kinsfolk are expected to be lov-
ing, just and generous to one another and not to demand
strictly equivalent returns from one another. (pp. 231–232,
237, emphasis added)
In Goodenough’s terms, an individual must be suffi-
ciently knowledgeable about the kinship terminology
and expected behavior on the part of kinsmen in order
for that person to be accepted as a kinsman by the
group members, thereby benefiting from the function-
ality that derives from being part of a group of persons
who are kin to another and who act in accordance with
their cultural knowledge regarding the behavior
expected of kinsmen, such as Fortes’ notion of pre-
scriptive altruism. However, contrary to the notion of
culture expressed in Tylor’s definition and its depen-
dency on a social context for its functionality to be rea-
lized in the way Goodenough indicates, the DIT view
of the relationship between biology and culture consid-
ers the domain of biological traits and of cultural traits
to differ by the means of transmission and not by the
nature of what constitutes the cultural domain in com-
parison with the biological domain.
The DIT use of the mode of transmission to define
cultural traits implies that artifacts are considered to be
cultural objects in a very particular way. It suffices that
the artifact reoccurs across generations as the instantia-
tion of ideas that are transmitted as traditions. Hence,
the phenotype—for example, the instantiation of an
idea regarding the shape and form for an artifact—is
transmitted from one artisan to another artisan when
an artifact is made in accordance with this idea. The
artifact made by one artisan can serve as a stimulus for
producing the same shape and form of an artifact by a
second artisan. Viewing artifact production by artisans
in this manner allows the artifact to be considered as
the material and observable representation of unseen
ideas about the form and shape an artifact should have.
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In this framework, cultural evolution is then measured
by, for example, change in the form and shape of arti-
facts and cultural complexity is equated with the com-
plexity of the artifact. A major difficulty with this
scenario, though, is that the artifact is not, itself, a cul-
tural trait.
4. Artifacts and the definition of culture
In the first half of the 20th century, archeologists
worked out the relationship between artifacts—the
material remains from past societies and recovered by
archeologists through excavation of past habitation
areas—and culture (see Read, 2007a). Archeologist
Irving Rouse set forth what became foundational ideas
for American archeologists regarding the connection
between artifacts and culture. Rouse set out a series of
propositions regarding artifacts, the first of which is
especially pertinent here. In his first proposition, he
made it clear that the ensemble of artifacts produced
by group members do not constitute the culture of a
group: ‘‘(1) Culture does not consist of artifacts. The
latter are merely the results of culturally conditioned
behavior performed by the artisan’’ (Rouse, 1939, p.
15). Rouse based his argument on Tylor’s definition of
culture as a ‘‘complex whole.’’ According to Rouse,
what constitutes culture, though, is not the physical
object, but the concepts and ideas underlying the pro-
duction of an artifact. In a similar vein, the eminent
archeologist Walter Taylor (1948/1967) comments that
material culture ‘‘consists only of objectifications of
culture and does not constitute culture itself’’ (p. 100).
Likewise, the eminent British anthropologist Edmund
Leach opines, ‘‘I shall here use ‘culture’ in Tylor’s nar-
rower sense, while distinguishing the material part of
the cultural heritage as ‘the products of culture’’’
(Leach 1965, p. 24).
Rouse and others with similar viewpoints were not
rejecting the commonly held notion of artifacts being
part of ‘‘material culture,’’ but were considering that the
latter was too limited a notion of how artifacts relate to
culture (Graves, 1994). Artifacts are not simply another
kind of culture—material culture—but are the instan-
tiation of an idea system held by the artisans and users
of artifacts, and the goal of the archeologist is to abduce
that idea system from the properties of the artifacts
made in accordance with the concepts and ideas shared
by artisans as part of their culture. Rouse recognized
that a primary distinction needs to be made between
those features of an artifact that are a consequence of
culture; that is, are the consequence of ideas held in
common by artisans who are part of the same culture
regarding ideas about the characteristics of artifacts,
and those features of artifacts that are specific to the
artisan who made the artifact. Rouse also recognized
that some features are idiosyncratic and are neither the
consequence of culture nor the consequence of ideas
held by individual artisans. How these ideas can be
implemented systematically and objectively is discussed
in the work by Read (2007a). And, although Tylor’s
concept of culture has been critiqued and revised by
both archeologists and anthropologists, his
old-time culture concept still plays an integrating role as a
central reference point even for the radically revisionist
anthropologists, for whom it is variously a bête noire, a
punching bag, or a springboard to alternative perspectives
on the human condition, past and present. (Watson, 1995,
p. 690)
Although constraint, development and sources of
variation are debated in the context of DIT (e.g.
Eerkens & Lipo, 2005, 2007; Lycett & von Cramon-
Taubadel, 2015; O’Brien & Bentley, 2011; O’Brien,
Lyman, Mesoudi, & VanPool, 2010), the theoretical
substrate is still fundamentally derived from a model of
something else, namely, biological trait transmission.
So, the focus, in practice, reflects old and partially
obsolete biological considerations. For example, any
consideration of variational constraints will focus on
features that are intrinsic to the artifact itself (such as
properties of the raw material) or to the processes by
which it is transmitted.
5. Definition of system complexity
Like pornography, we know complexity when we see it,
but it is hard to define precisely what we mean by com-
plexity of a system. One useful distinction is that
between dynamical and organizational complexity (e.g.
Andersson, Törnberg, & Törnberg, 2014b; Andersson
& Törnberg, 2018; Érdi, 2008), where the former corre-
sponds to the massively parallel interaction between
large numbers of entities (such as flocks of birds, traffic,
and biological populations), and the latter corresponds
to what we might term ‘‘complicatedness.’’ That is, the
type of organization prevalent within adapted func-
tional wholes (such as organisms and machines)—cor-
responding to Simon’s concept of near-decomposability
(Simon, 1962; Wimsatt, 1975) with a level-hierarchical
organization of modules that combine high internal
integration with high external separation. The former
types of systems may, or may not, have functions (e.g.
collective ant behavior contra galaxy formation), while
the latter are usually adapted systems to which we attri-
bute function—both internally, with respect to the
whole (e.g. the function of a heart in an organism), and
externally with respect to the interaction between the
whole and an environment (e.g. the ecological niche of
the organism). For dynamical complexity, the number
of interacting parts may be a useful proxy for the degree
of complexity, whereas for a different context, a mea-
sure of complexity could be the number of different
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relations, or functions, expressed through correlated
parts and not the number of parts, per se (McShea,
2000). Another way we can think of complexity is the
substitutability of parts for one another without affect-
ing the behavior of the system. By this criterion, a Swiss
watch is complex since one part cannot be substituted
for another, whereas a gas composed of the same kinds
of molecules would be simple since one gas molecule
may be substituted for another gas molecule without
affecting the behavior of the gas.
In the end, it is unlikely that complexity reduces to
some necessary and sufficient essence. The term does
not derive from a classical definition but more as a col-
loquial label for the experience of being cognitively
overwhelmed (Andersson, Törnberg, & Törnberg,
2014b; Andersson & Törnberg, 2018)—which may hap-
pen in a number of ways. With human groups, com-
plexity thereby relates to the extent to which cultural
life places a cognitive burden on the group members. A
group composed of students attending a lecture and a
professor giving a lecture to the students would be a
simple group for the group members since each mem-
ber understands the roles and behaviors of the other
group members. A group of politicians negotiating leg-
islation, on the contrary, would be perceived by most
as a complex group. We see politicians in shifting fac-
tions, each concealing additional layers of similar com-
plexity in their own parties and networks, and each
with different interests with regard to the legislation in
question. This makes for a cognitively highly demand-
ing environment where the distinction between the
political game and its rules is blurred.
In these latter two examples, complexity relates to
the number of different components that are involved
with regard to what is required for the system to act in
a coordinated manner and have consistent outcomes.
This suggests that a first approximation to the com-
plexity of a system is to measure complexity by the
number of distinct system components that need to
interact in a coordinated manner for the system to be
coherent, resilient, and to continue to operate as a sus-
tainable system. By coherent is meant that the interact-
ing components of the system do not, simply by their
mode of interacting, lead to the collapse or breakdown
of the system. Lack of coherency may arise for a vari-
ety of reasons and includes lack of fit between compo-
nents, mismatch in the timing of the action of one
component with another component, and so on. By
resilience is meant the ability of the system to revert
back to its normal operating state after an external
shock or force impinges on the operating state of the
system. By being sustainable is meant that the system
can function in the same manner over repeated
instances of the system’s operation or over timescales
much longer than the internal timescale of the system.
For human groups, an added consideration that
needs to be considered is not only the performance of
the system but also the support systems that may be
required for the performance of the system in question.
Thus, the system composed of a professor giving a lec-
ture to a group of students is part of a larger system con-
sisting of a university; the organization of university
activities into events such as courses, an administrative
system for the enrollment of students in courses, the
assignment of professors to be the lecture for a class, the
physical structure of the university, the position of a uni-
versity in a larger community; and so on. The complex-
ity of a group, then, involves not just the phenomenal
level of the behavior of the members of a group but also
the complexity at the ideational level of the cultural idea
systems (Leaf & Read, 2012) that provide the shared
framework within which group members interact.
This is why we cannot automatically assume that the
complexity of an artifact, as an artifact, reflects the
complexity of the cultural idea system underlying its
production. A lower degree of artifact complexity does
not, by itself, imply a lower overall complexity of the
ideational system for which the artifacts are the instan-
tiation. For example, hunter-gatherer societies face
trade-offs between mobility and the production and
transportation of artifacts that affect the complexity of
the artifacts (Read, 2008).
We need, then, to take into consideration the differ-
ence between the complexity of an artifact as an artifact
and the complexity of an artifact as the consequence of
a cultural idea system that has conditioned the behavior
of an artisan in producing the artifact. For the latter it
follows that we need to consider how complexity relates
to the modes, attributes, or idiosyncratic features of an
artifact that reflect the idea system and not just the
number of parts. Consider how we might compare the
complexity of a tool (a termite stick) made by a chim-
panzee and a tool (Acheulean hand axe) made by a
hominin ancestor (Homo erectus) of Homo sapiens.
6. Complexity of a chimpanzee termite
stick versus an Acheulean hand axe
Termite sticks are made by chimpanzees to get termites
out of termite mounds for consumption. The termite
stick is made by breaking off a short branch from a
bush or a small tree, then removing the leaves and any
side sub-branches from the branch, and then modifying
the end of the tool with their teeth (see, for example,
Sanz & Morgan, 2007, pp. 430–431). This leaves a short
stick that can be inserted into an opening in the termite
mound. When the stick is removed from the termite
mound, there may be termites attached to the stick that
can then be licked off and eaten by the chimpanzee. In
terms of number of parts, a termite stick has complexity
C = 1.
Stone tools referred to as Acheulean hand axes were
first made about 1.7 mya in Africa (Asfaw et al., 1992;
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Diez-Martı́n et al., 2015) by Homo ergaster/erectus and
later by Homo heidelbergensis (Corbey et al., 2016) and,
through the early expansion of Homo out of Africa, had
a wide distribution across the Old World (Petraglia &
Shipton, 2008). Their function, though, remains conten-
tious. While there is general agreement that they were
used for tasks involving cutting or scraping, other, very
different, functions that have been suggested include
throwing them as a weapon or using them for social
and/or sexual signaling (see Corbey et al., 2016). Early
hand axes were made with a minimal amount of flake
removal and later ones were well-made, showing the
mastery of the technology of conchoidal flake removal.
Hand axes continued to be made throughout the Lower
Paleolithic for almost 1.5 mya, with more recent hand
axes dating to around 500 kya.
Hand axes have a characteristic flattened, generally
symmetric shape with a shape ranging from lanceolate
to ovate to orbiculate (Corbey et al., 2016). The shape
is produced by removing flakes through flaking. In
addition to making the shape of the hand axe by flake
removal, the stone from which the hand axe was made
was also made thinner by removing flakes from the
front and back surfaces. For this reason, hand axes are
said to be bi-facial. They vary in size from small to
large. If the number of parts is the measure of complex-
ity, a hand axe also has complexity C = 1; hence, for
this measure, termite sticks and hand axes are equally
complex.
One thing that C, the number of parts, does not
measure is precisely the differences in the idea systems
brought to bear in the production of a hand axe versus
a termite stick. For C to be a relevant measure, we
must assume that the production processes behind the
artifacts are of similar complexity.
The Acheulean hand axe brings us to the related
question of whether, and if so to what degree, the com-
plexity observed is cultural in the first place. If hand
axes are a cultural object as understood by archeolo-
gists such as Irving Rouse, this requires that they would
have to have been produced in accordance with a
shared idea system. To some, the fact that hand axes
had the same shape worldwide and for over 1000 mil-
lennia suggests that their persistent common shape was
due to genetic inheritance rather than to traditional
inheritance, let alone to the inheritance of a shared sys-
tem of ideas.
This judgment may be more intuitive than argued, of
course. It seems, though, that cultural inheritance
would not be capable of maintaining stasis in shape
worldwide and for over a million years. Constraints
could arise from different sources that are not mutually
exclusive, including the stone flaking technology itself,
the raw material used, and the intended functionality of
the hand axe. Another explanation is that the hand axe
was a key enabler of a flexible system of adaptation and
so was itself not subject to flexibility due to Generative
Entrenchment (Andersson et al., 2014a; Wimsatt, 1999,
2015; Wimsatt & Griesemer, 2007). That is, altering its
design may have had immediate cascading maladaptive
repercussions in dependent parts of the cultural system.
But, notably, the potential for strong cultural lock-in
effects opens the door also for genetic scaffolding. If the
hand axe came to serve such a critical role in hominin
life, its faithful reproduction (a narrow reaction norm)
may have been increasingly buttressed by genetic cana-
lization of behavior through a Baldwin (1896) effect
(see also Sterelny, 2004). That is, genetic factors that
made the desired outcome more likely would be selected
for (Corbey et al., 2016; Foley, 1987; Richerson &
Boyd, 2005).
But perhaps even more likely, and more preserving
of the trademark flexibility of hominin behavior, is that
cultural and genetic organization stabilized the trans-
mission process itself. Something that was traditional,
yet critically important, could, moreover, have acted as
an evolutionary driver for derived general teaching and
learning in Homo (Castro & Toro, 2014; Csibra &
Gergely, 2009, 2011; Tehrani & Riede, 2008).
Another constraint may have been the limited size of
short-term working memory (STWM) for the hominins
making hand axes. STWM increased during hominin
evolution from 2 6 1 for the common ancestor of Pan
and Homo (Read, 2006) to 7 6 2 for modern Homo
sapiens (Miller, 1956), so the STWM of Homo erectus
would be about 4–5 (see Figure 2 in Read & van der
Leeuw, 2008). Assuming the production of hand axes
was at the upper bound of the cognitive abilities of
Homo erectus, introduction of the more complex stone
tool technology that marks the end of making hand
axes would only occur after there was an increase in
STWM. The stasis in Homo brain encephalization from
around 1.8 mya to around 0.6 mya (Ruff, Trinkhaus &
Holliday, 1997) implies stasis in STWM over this time
period, hence to stasis in stone tool technology as well.
Following Stout (2011), we will express an inferred
idea system for the production of a hand axe as a hier-
archical sequence of goals and subgoals involved in the
production of a hand axe. In Figure 1, the upper tree
diagram identifies the major subgoals involved in mak-
ing a hand axe. This includes the hand axe shape that is
produced by first roughing out the desired shape from
a quarried nodule through flaking, and then making a
more refined shape by the controlled removal of small
flakes along the boundary of the hand axe and from
the front and back surfaces. The boxed tree diagram in
Figure 1 elaborates on the flaking process and shows
that the complex flake detachment used in making
hand axes involves several subgoals: the location on the
object where a flake is to be removed, the choice of a
knapping hammer, and the use of percussion as the
means to remove the flake. The subgoal of percussion
removal has a series of subgoals and each of these has
additional subgoals. Of these, some may be modes
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(assuming hand axes are cultural objects), in which case
the subgoal that is a mode will be executed in a compa-
rable manner by all artisans. Other subgoals refer to
attributes which one artisan may accomplish in a differ-
ent manner than another artisan, and yet other sub-
goals may have idiosyncratic outcomes, such as
(hypothetically) the orientation of a flake on one face
of the hand axe in comparison with the orientation of a
flake removal in the same position but on the other
face of the hand axe. If we consider the sequence of
subgoals involved in making a hand axe, its complexity
is poorly measured by just the number of parts of the
artifact.
We can compare the termite stick to the hand axe by
working out a similar diagram identifying the subgoals
involved in making a termite stick. First of all, none of
the features of a termite stick are modes since chimpan-
zees cannot communicate with each other regarding
features of a termite stick and then reach agreement on
which features will be done in the same way by all
chimpanzees making termite sticks. Some features, such
as the diameter of the termite stick, are attributes in
Rouse’s vocabulary since a chimpanzee does not ran-
domly break off a branch regardless of the diameter of
the branch, but selects a branch having a diameter size
that will fit into the openings of a termite mound.
There will be similarity in diameter size across termite
sticks since each chimpanzee needs essentially the same
diameter size in order for the termite stick to fit into
the termite mound. A feature such as length may be
idiosyncratic since there is no single, optimal length,
but a range of length values that make for effective ter-
mite sticks; hence, a chimpanzee may not attempt to
make any particular length within the range of feasible
lengths for a termite stick. There is no community with
a culture for making termite sticks conditioning the
behavior of the chimpanzee. As indicated in Figure 2,
the idea system tree implemented independently by
each individual chimpanzee is shallow as only a few
subgoals are involved. The initial subgoal is to remove
a branch from a bush and then shape the branch.
Shaping has the subgoal of stripping leaves and side
branches from the branch, leaving a stick that becomes
the termite stick.
Comparison of Figures 1 and 2 shows that from the
perspective of the idea system involved in producing an
artifact, an Acheulean hand axe is much more complex
than a termite stick. Acheulean hand axes were used
for processing multiple types of materials, which indi-
cates that they were integrated into a wider cultural
fabric of traditional practices. At the same time, some of
the subgoals of the Acheulean hand axe appear to be
Figure 1. Handaxe subgoal hierarchy. Flake detachment: (a) select target, (b) select hammer, (c) select percussion—percussion has
subgoals: (d) position the core, (e) hammerstone grip, (f) strike core—percussion also involves, (g) prepare platform, (h)
hammerstone selection, (i) position the core, (j) use light percussion. Additional subgoals are (k) hammerstone grip, (l) grasping, and
(m) rotating the object.
Source: Modified from Stout (2011, p. 1052) by Gärdenfors and Högberg (2017).
Read and Andersson 11
constrained by the nature of the task; for example, a
hammerstone grip is used for holding the percussion
stone used in flaking and so will be similar across arti-
sans without requiring community consensus on how to
grip a hammerstone, indicating that its production may
contain some, but perhaps surprisingly little, and thereby
robust, cultural scaffolding. The Acheulean hand axe
appears to have been part of a holistic system that was
inherited partly genetically and partly culturally.
This contrasts sharply with the termite sticks made
by chimpanzees. If a chimpanzee community stops fish-
ing for termites or ‘‘forgets’’ how to make termite sticks,
they lose the termites but no other activities will be
affected adversely by the loss. At most, if not a total
lack, they have only a very tenuous system of interde-
pendent activities.
We can refer to such decoupled traditions as statisti-
cally shared ideas. They are not culturally shared ideas.
Even though individuals may statistically share the
same idea, a statistically shared idea is not, by itself, a
marker of a cultural attribute. This is especially clear
with termite sticks. Each chimpanzee utilizes the same
idea system shown in Figure 2 for the production of
termite sticks, so chimpanzees statistically share the
same idea system and termite sticks are all similar to
each other. However, if they stop using termite sticks,
no other practice will be affected in a major way since
no other tradition relies significantly on termite sticks
and, conversely, making termite sticks does not rely on
other traditions, thus termite stick making does not
have the coupling of traditions associated with cultural
idea systems.
7. Complexity through implement
utilization
Another way that relating complexity just to measur-
able aspects of an artifact can be misleading regards
the use of an artifact in a task. How the artifact is used
to achieve the intended goal also involves an idea sys-
tem. Consider the nut cracking by chimpanzees. This is
a traditional practice that contains no artifacts with
imposed forms at all, but instead selected objects are
organized into an adapted system (that indeed itself
may be viewed as an artifact). Complexity here resides
in the ability to inter-operate all of the parts of this sys-
tem, which is cognitively demanding to do. To crack a
nut, a chimpanzee places a nut on a stone anvil and hits
it with a stone, an action that cracks the nut shell and
gives the chimpanzee access to the nut meat inside of
the shell. The chimpanzee then eats the nut meat.
Although a simple task for humans, it poses a challenge
for some chimpanzees. The chimpanzees crack nuts in
a group, so mature adults cracking and eating nuts pro-
vide models for juveniles to watch and to learn how to
crack nuts. It takes about 2 years for infant chimpan-
zees to learn how to crack nuts by watching other
chimpanzees crack nuts, beginning roughly at 3 years
of age and only succeeding in cracking nuts when they
are about 5 years of age, around the time a chimpanzee
reaches physical and sexual maturity (Matsuzawa,
2007). Striking is the fact that about 20% of the chim-
panzees never learn to crack nuts. Instead, these chim-
panzees place a nut on the anvil and hit the nut with
her or his fist, or they place the nut on the ground and
hit the nut with a rock. They never learn the sequence:
position a stone anvil on the ground, place a nut on the
anvil, then hit the nut on the anvil with a stone.
We can divide this sequence into two parts: (1) pro-
duction of the implement—an anvil and
hammerstone—and (2) utilization of the implement.
Figure 3 shows the system of ideas involved in making
an implement for cracking nuts. Two primary subgoals
are a flat surface and a hammering object. (That the
hammering object is a subgoal can be seen in the fact
that chimpanzees in Taı̈ National Park in Côte
D’Ivoire will collect and carry rocks with them that are
then used to crack nuts (Boesch & Boesch, 1983).) The
flat surface has three possible subgoals when subgoals
are summed over different nut-cracking chimpanzee
groups: an exposed tree root with a flat surface (a
Figure 2. Subgoals for making a termite stick.
Figure 3. Subgoals for making an implement to crack nuts.
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subgoal for chimpanzees at Taı̈ National Park (Boesch
& Boesch, 1983)), a rock with one side relatively flat (a
subgoal for chimpanzees at Bossou in Guinea;
McGrew, Ham, White, Tutin, & Fernandez, 1997), and
the ground itself (this becomes a subgoal for some of
the chimpanzees that never learn to crack nuts with an
anvil). The flat stone has the subgoal of being a stable
flat surface. The rock with a flat surface may already
be stable. If not, chimpanzees have been observed to
use small stones as ‘‘wedges’’ to stabilize the rock
(Matsuzawa, 1996). The hammering object has two
subgoals: a stone that will be used for hammering a nut
or, for some of the chimpanzees that do not learn to
crack nuts, the hand will be made into a fist and the
nut will be hit with the fist.
The nut-cracking implement is used to crack nuts.
Successful nut cracking involves a two-step hierarchy of
actions: (1) place a nut on the anvil and (2) hit the nut
with a rock hammering object. Successful implementa-
tion of the nut-cracking device requires that three ideas
be kept in mind simultaneously through STWM: use
the anvil as the source of a flat surface, place a nut on
the anvil, and then strike the nut with a hammerstone.
All three must be active in short-term memory to imple-
ment correctly the hierarchical relationship of the two
subactions: place nut on surface and hit nut with ham-
mering object (see Figure 4).
Now consider the fact that 20% of the chimpanzees
never learn to crack nuts even though they watch other
chimpanzees successfully crack nuts. The unsuccessful
chimpanzees either place the nut on the anvil and then
hit the nut with a fist (Figure 5(a)) or place the nut on
the ground and hit the nut with a hammerstone (Figure
5(b)). (Some chimpanzees possibly place a nut on the
ground and then hit it with a fist, but this has not been
reported.) In both cases, the chimpanzee makes use of a
natural object—the ground or a fist—hence the action
only requires STWM = 2.
While there is a strong correlation between the size
of STWM and measures of cognitive abilities, the rela-
tionship is not completely deterministic. Cognitive abil-
ities involve a variety of neurological processes. An
overly simplistic model for the performance of chim-
panzees measured by the ability to learn to crack nuts
would be that chimpanzees with a STWM = 1 or 2 do
not learn to crack nuts and it is the chimpanzees with
STWM = 3 that learn to crack nuts. A more realistic
model would be that chimpanzees with STWM = 1
never learn to crack nuts, some chimpanzees with
STWM = 2 do not learn to crack nuts and other chim-
panzees with STWM = 2 do learn to crack nuts
through using other neurological processes that ‘‘com-
pensate’’ for the limitations of STWM = 2, and all
chimpanzees with STWM = 3 learn to crack nuts. Let
us use this characterization of nut cracking by chim-
panzees to form a thought experiment in which we
Figure 4. Subgoals for cracking nuts.
Figure 5. Unsuccessful idea systems: (a) hit nut with a fist and (b) place nut on the ground.
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include the role of phenotypic transmission for a non-
genetic trait such as cracking nuts.
8. Thought experiment
We can make a thought experiment based on chimpan-
zee nut cracking as a way to explore the validity of the
treadmill model that purportedly links cultural evolu-
tion of cultural complexity through the DIT model to
the size of the population of interacting individuals.
The purpose of the thought experiment is to incorpo-
rate the assumptions of the treadmill model and then
to determine whether the connection it claims to have
demonstrated between the interaction population size
and cultural complexity is valid under the conditions
assumed for the treadmill model.
The essence of the treadmill model is its dependence
on three non-controversial assumptions, though how
the third assumption is implemented is problematic.
First, it is assumed that phenotypic transmission
through imitation is subject to transmission degrada-
tion. Second, it is assumed that skillful individuals, even
when imitating a degraded target, can produce a non-
degraded version of the degraded target. In effect, this
assumption only requires that when imitating a
degraded target, a skillful individual can recognize in
what way just imitation of the target will lead to a
degraded execution of the target and can then correct
the degradation. In effect, the assumption is based on
the idea that a skillful person does not merely imitate a
target in a rote manner, but through emulation
(Tomasello, 1996) by recognizing, in the case of nut
cracking, how effective nut cracking must proceed and
whether simply imitating the target is effective or not,
and if not, what would need to be modified to make nut
cracking effective. The third assumption follows directly
from the fact that the expected value, N, for the number
of persons of a given skill level in a population is given
by N = p3 n, where p is the probability of a person
having the specified skill level and n is the population
size. It follows that the expected number of individuals
with a specified skill level increases with population size.
Next, construct the thought experiment.
For purposes of the thought experiment, assume
20% of the chimpanzees have STWM = 1, 60% have
STWM = 2, and 20% have STWM = 3. Assume that
chimpanzees with STWM = 3 are skillful, so according
to the second assumption, they can learn to crack nuts
not in just a rote manner but are able to put together a
mental nut-cracking model that identifies for them what
makes nut cracking effective, such as the surface of the
anvil should be horizontal and not sloped, the hammer-
stone should be roughly spherical in shape, the size of
the hammerstone should be such that it is easily held in
the hand and is large enough so that the momentum
imparted from the arm by a striking motion suffices to
crack the nut but not so great as to smash completely
the nut. Consequently, we can model the imitation of a
target by a chimpanzee with STWM = 3 as shown in
Figure 6. Even if the skill level for the nut-cracking
device employed by the target for cracking nuts is low
(e.g. the anvil is at an angle or the hammerstone is too
small), a chimpanzee with STWM = 3 and imitating
the target will end up putting together a nut-cracking
device that can be used skillfully to crack nuts.
For a chimpanzee with STWM = 2, the skill level
achieved, according to assumption 1, will be less than
that of the target (see Figure 7). If the target skill level
is close to the boundary for the skill level required for
being able to crack nuts, then the implement produced
through imitation will not suffice for cracking nuts (not
shown). Assuming the degree of skill level lost through
imitation is a function of the imitation process itself, it
follows that the mean skill level of those with STWM
= 2 will decrease in each round of nut cracking. For a
chimpanzee with STWM = 1, assume the skill level
attained, regardless of the skill level of the target, is
below the skill required for nut cracking.
Assuming that the most skilled individual will be the
target individual for phenotypic transmission through
imitation (as in Henrich, 2004), it follows that if there
are individuals with STWM = 3, then the average skill
level in the population will not decrease since individu-
als with STWM = 3 perform at a high skill level even
after imitation. Individuals with STWM = 2 will per-
form at a degraded skill level after imitation, but some
of them will still able to crack nuts at a degraded skill
Figure 6. The variable z measures the skill level of a
chimpanzee. The vertical line shows the minimum skill level
needed to crack nuts. Skillful chimpanzee with STWM = 3
imitates a target doing nut cracking with a low skill level (solid
disk). Dashed arrow shows that the skillful chimpanzee, through
emulation, cracks nuts with a high level of skill (open disk).
Figure 7. Chimpanzee with STWM = 2 (open disk) imitates a
target doing nut cracking with a high skill level (solid disk).
Dashed arrow shows that the chimpanzee, through imitation,
cracks nuts with a lowered level of skill.
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level. However, their degraded skill level will not
decrease further so long as, in the next generation,
there are STWM = 3 individuals who crack nuts effec-
tively and so they can imitate individuals with STWM
= 3 in the next generation of nut cracking. Individuals
with STWM = 1 cannot crack nuts and have a skill
level below the level required for cracking nuts even
when the target they imitate has a high skill level for
cracking nuts.
If, for whatever reason, individuals with STWM =
3 are lost from the population, then the average skill
level will reduce with each generation of imitation since
the resetting of the target skill level by individuals with
STWM = 3 no longer occurs and the STWM = 2
chimpanzees imitate at a skill level below that of the
target. Since the target for the next generation will, at
best, be an individual with STWM = 2 and will have a
degraded skill level, the average skill level for the
STWM = 2 individuals will decrease from one genera-
tion to the next. Chimpanzees with STWM = 1 have
skill levels after imitation below the target skill level
and below what is required to crack nuts, regardless of
the skill level of the target. Eventually, then, the popu-
lation will lose the ability to crack nuts.
Conversely, for a population that initially does not
have the skill required to crack nuts, and if, for what-
ever reason, an individual with skill level STWM = 3
is introduced into the population, this individual may
work out nut cracking and if so will become the target
individual. The skill level of the STWM = 2 (and
STWM = 1) individuals will be reset when the individ-
ual with STWM = 3 becomes the target individual, so
individuals with STWM = 2 will now imitate the new
target individual and be able to crack nuts, though in a
degraded manner as indicated in Figure 7, since they
do not imitate the target individual perfectly. The aver-
age skill level of the implements will increase.
The thought experiment, then, performs in the same
manner as the treadmill model (see Henrich, 2004)—a
trait requiring a high skill level for its effective occur-
rence may be lost if highly skilled target individuals are
no longer present, perhaps, according to the treadmill
model, by a sufficient decrease in the interaction popu-
lation size so that it is unlikely that there will be a
highly skilled person in the reduced population size.
Conversely, if the presence of a highly skilled individual
becomes more likely due to increase in the interaction
population size, and if this highly skilled person invents
(or reinvents) the trait and becomes the target individ-
ual, then the trait will increase in its frequency of occur-
rence, though in degraded form except by individuals
who are highly skilled. Thus, the thought experiment
makes the same predictions as the treadmill model.
At first glance, the thought experiment seems to ver-
ify the treadmill model. However, closer examination
shows that this is not the case. The treadmill model
assumes that the addition of a highly skilled person into
the population is due to increase in the interaction pop-
ulation size by virtue of assumption 3, namely, that in
smaller populations the expected number of extremely
skilled persons is smaller than in larger populations.
Consider in more detail the assumption of the treadmill
model that a more highly skilled individual is intro-
duced into the population by increase in the interaction
population size. For illustrative purposes, consider how
this relates to the occurrence of individuals with high
IQ scores under the usual assumption that m = 100
and s = 15 for IQ scores. For chimpanzee nut crack-
ing, we assumed in the thought experiment that 20% of
the population is skilled at nut cracking (STWM = 3).
The top 20% of IQ scores would correspond to those
individuals with IQ ø 113. From Table 1, in a popula-
tion with five persons, E[N|n = 5, IQ ø 113] = 1
(‘‘expected number N of persons with IQ ø 113 in a
group of n = 5 persons is 1 person’’), so even with a
family size group, there should be at least one individ-
ual who is reasonably skilled. For IQ ø 130, the IQ
score for a person to be considered mentally gifted, a
group of size 50—slightly larger than a residence group
in a hunter-gatherer society—would have E[N|n = 50,
IQ ø 130] = 1. For a hunter-gatherer society of n =
500 persons, we would expect 10 persons with IQ ø
130. For a population of size n = 8000, which is the
estimated interaction population size of Tasmania
before isolation from the mainland (Henrich, 2004),
and with p = 0.0125% (corresponding to an IQ ø
155, which is close to the highest score of 160 in the
Stanford–Binet IQ test), we would have E[N|n = 8000,
IQ ø 155) = 1. For an interacting population of size n
= 4000, the estimated interaction population size of
Tasmania after it was isolated from the mainland due
to the increase in ocean levels, we would have E[N|n =
4000, IQ ø 155] = 0.5; thus, for groups of size n =
4000, on average, one-half of them would not have any
Table 1. Expected number of persons.
Probability Expected number of persons
0.0125% 0.000625 0.00125 0.03125 0.0625 0.125 0.5 1 IQ ø 155
2% 0.1 0.2 1 10 20 80 160 IQ ø 130
20% 1 2 10 100 200 800 1600 IQ ø 113
Population size 5 10 50 500 1000 4000 8000
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individual with IQ ø 155. This indicates that it would
require a skill level of at least IQ = 155 in order for the
reduction in the interaction population size from n =
8000 to n = 4000 to result in the smaller population
possibly not having any individual with an IQ matching
the highest IQ level that could be found in at least one
individual in an interacting population with n = 8000).
In other words, the demographic effect upon which the
treadmill model depends, namely, that a larger popula-
tion may have a highly skilled person but a smaller
population may lack an equally skilled individual, only
applies to genius-level skills when considering popula-
tions the size of simple hunter-gatherer societies. Yet, it
does not require a genius to make a simple bone point
and simple clothing. If it did, this would require that
the far more complex tools found in other hunter-
gatherer societies would require even substantially
higher IQs than this for their invention.
These data show clearly that it is only with skill levels
at the gifted-to-genius range, and only for groups smaller
than 50 persons that are likely to lack a skilled person.
For hunter-gatherer societies, with a modal value of n =
500–600 persons (Read, 2012a), we expect 10 persons to
be in the 98th percentile or higher (see Table 1). We con-
clude, then, that the likelihood of not having a highly
skilled person in a population due to the population size
only applies to small populations with at most 10–50 per-
sons, and even then, it only applies to highly skilled per-
sons. Thus, the treadmill, as a driver for increasing the
skill level with which a task is performed, is applicable at
best to small sub-populations within a hunter-gatherer
society and does not apply meaningfully to the entire
hunter-gatherer society. Nonetheless, the proponents of
the treadmill model claim that it is supported by experi-
mental data and by data for hunter-gatherer societies.
Consider the experimental data first.
9. Experimental data for testing the
treadmill model
A variety of experiments have been performed, purport-
ing to support the treadmill model applied to hunter-
gatherer societies (e.g. Caldwell & Millen, 2010; Derex
et al., 2013; Kempe & Mesoudi, 2014; Muthukrishna,
Shulman, Vasilescu, & Henrich, 2014). Common to all
of these experiments is the small size of the group
involved in the experiment. For example, Caldwell and
Millen used groups with n= 1 to n= 3 individuals and
their experiment did not show any difference in perfor-
mance between the two group sizes. Their experiment
was critiqued by Muthukrishna et al. as involving a sin-
gle imitation model too simple in its design (a paper air-
plane) to show any effect on performance by the small
difference in group size in the experiment.
These small group sizes, alone, invalidate an experi-
ment as a test of the treadmill model since the effects
determined on small population sizes, whether positive
or negative, cannot be assumed to scale up to popula-
tion sizes comparable to the size of hunter-gatherer
populations. Furthermore, the experiments, for the
most part, are not designed to test the effect of the
interaction population size on group performance due
to a small group not having a highly skilled individual,
while a much larger interacting population is likely to
have a highly skilled individual, as posited in the tread-
mill model. For example, the independently performed
experiments by Muthukrishna et al. and by Kempe and
Mesoudi each used several imitation models to avoid
the problems with the Caldwell and Millen experiment,
but still used small group sizes. Muthukrishna et al.
compared the performance of a group with size n = 1
with a group with size n = 5, while Kempe and Millen
used a group size of n = 3 for the larger group in the
comparison. Although the larger groups performed
better, it is not clear whether this is due to group size
difference leading to the inclusion of a more skilled per-
son in the group or to some other factor.
A general problem with these experiments, then, in
addition to the very small group sizes, is that even when
different population sizes are part of the experiment,
there is no determination of the skill levels of the indi-
viduals in a small group versus a larger group; hence,
any difference in performance between a smaller and a
larger group cannot be attributed to the larger group
having a more skilled target person by virtue of it being
a larger group, which is the core argument of the tread-
mill model. The experiment by Derex et al. is an exam-
ple, which considers different group sizes (n = 4, 8, 16)
and does find differences in performance according to
group size. However, the differences are in the wrong
direction. Performance by larger groups in their experi-
ment is worse than the performance by smaller groups
(Andersson & Read, 2014). In addition, the only other
effect they found is simply the well-known fact that
smaller populations are more prone to drift (Andersson
& Read, 2014). In reply to these observations, Derex,
Beugin, Godelle, and Raymond (2014) state, ‘‘Even if
explained by sample size effect, this supports the group
size hypothesis: sample size effect is expected to be the
main mechanism by which group size affects cultural evo-
lution’’ (p. E2, emphasis added). However, the claim of
the treadmill model is not the well-known effect of drift
as a function of sample size, but the consequences of a
larger group more likely including a highly skilled indi-
vidual. None of the experiments purporting to support
the treadmill model, then, actually test the demographic
process modeled in the treadmill model (Andersson &
Read, 2016).
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10. Data on hunter-gatherer and fishing
societies
Data on tool complexity in hunter-gatherer and fishing
societies are unequivocal. There is no correlation
between either population size or the interaction popu-
lation size and the complexity of artifacts in any of
these societies. To see this, consider four sets of data.
The first set is the data on Tasmanian hunter-gatherers
since they were considered to provide an ideal data set
for testing the treadmill model due to archeological
documentation of the disappearance of bone points in
the Tasmanian archeological record around 8000 BP
when Tasmania was isolated from the Australian main-
land after a global rise in ocean levels. This, it has been
argued, leads to the maladaptive loss of warm clothing
(Henrich, 2004, 2006). The disappearance of bone
points in the archeological record, coupled with the
presumed reduction in the size of the interacting popu-
lation prior to the isolation of Tasmania, seemed to
provide unequivocal evidence for the treadmill model.
The second set will be meta data sets consisting of eth-
nographic data on the population size and population
density of hunter-gatherer societies that lead to statisti-
cally testing whether the predicted correlation between
the interaction population size and tool complexity is
verified. The third set is composed of the complex tools
made by Inuit groups in the Arctic. The fourth is a data
set on Oceania fishing groups for which it is claimed
(Kline & Boyd, 2010) that the complexity of fishing
hooks correlates with the population size, as predicted
by the treadmill model.
10.1. Tasmania data set
The bone points found in several archeological sites on
Tasmania have been referred to as complex tools and
the isolation of Tasmania has been interpreted as caus-
ing a change from an interacting population with
around 8000 persons when there was a land connection
between Tasmania and the mainland to a population of
about 4000 persons when the rising ocean levels iso-
lated Tasmania from the mainland (Henrich, 2004).
Thus, it appears that the loss of the supposedly com-
plex bone points occurred following the reduction in
the size of the interacting population on Tasmania and
consequently, according to the treadmill model, the
likely skill level of the most skilled person in Tasmania
was reduced due to the decrease in the interaction pop-
ulation size. As discussed above, though, this would
require a skill level corresponding to an IQ ø 155 for
making bone points for this to happen, hence bone
points would have to be complex tools. However, bone
points are simple tools (Mulvaney & Kamminga, 1999);
see also Figure 1 in Read, 2012b).
Figure 8 shows the idea system for making bone
points. As can be seen by comparing Figure 8 with
Figure 2, the complexity of the idea system for bone
points is essentially the same as that of the termite
sticks made by chimpanzees, yet Homo ergaster, with a
cranial capacity about two thirds of the cranial capac-
ity of modern Homo sapiens, regularly made Acheulean
hand axes that involved a far more complex idea sys-
tem (see Figure 3) even though there is no evidence that
Homo erectus individuals would have been part of
interacting populations larger than 4000 individuals.
Thus, it would not have required an interacting popula-
tion of 8000 individuals for there to be individuals with
the skill needed to make simple bone points.
Despite claims to the contrary (e.g. Henrich, 2004),
the Tasmanians did not lose the ability to make cloth-
ing. The first European explorers to contact the
Tasmanians noted that the Tasmanians, especially the
women, wore simple cloaks when the temperature was
especially cold. Prehistorically, during the ice ages,
when the Tasmanians made clothing using bone points
as awls, they were not making complex clothing like
the Inuit, as claimed by Henrich (2004, 2006), but were
making simple clothing (Gilligan, 2014) that matched
their thermal need for clothing given their degree of
biological adaptation to a cold climate (Gilligan, 2007).
The loss of bone points, which coincided with world-
wide warmer weather and the increase in ocean levels
(see Figure 2 in Read, 2012b), is most parsimoniously
explained by the Tasmanians no longer needing the
warmer clothing that required bone points for its man-
ufacture and so they stopped making bone points
(Gilligan, 2014).
10.2. Meta data sets on hunter-gatherers
Eight publications (Buchanan, O’Brien, & Collard,
2015; Collard, Buchanan, & O’Brien, 2013; Collard,
Buchanan, O’Brien, & Scholnick, 2013; Collard,
Buchanan, Ruttle, & O’Brien, 2011; 2005; Read, 2006,
2008, 2012b) have compared the population size of
hunter-gatherer societies to the complexity of their
implements. Seven of these publications have found
Figure 8. Subgoals for bone point shaping.
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that there is no correlation between population size
and implement complexity and one publication found a
negative correlation. One other publication (Collard,
Buchanan, Morin, & Costopoulos, 2011) found no sta-
tistically significant correlation between risk and popu-
lation size, but this is just a statistical artifact. The
researchers only included cases from the same region,
hence the cases included in the analysis had a narrow
range of risk values and, as is well known in statistics,
constraining the variance in the predictor variable to a
small range of values will always reduce the magnitude
of the correlation between the predictor variable and
the outcome variable in a regression analysis.
Altogether, none of the statistical modeling in these
eight publications supports the treadmill model.
Another four publications have used published data to
argue that there are conceptual problems with the
treadmill model (Andersson & Read, 2016; Collard,
Ruttle, Buchanan, & O’Brien, 2013; Read, 2011;
Vaesen, Collard, Cosgrove, & Roebroeks, 2016).
The proponents of the treadmill model have coun-
tered by saying that the sample of hunter-gatherer
populations used to compare population size with
implement complexity is skewed toward hunter-
gatherer groups from Northwest America and all of
these publications have used the census population size
rather than the interaction population size (see, for
example, Henrich, 2006; Henrich et al., 2016; Kline &
Boyd, 2010). The first objection is not valid since the
treadmill model is not region specific and predicts a
high correlation between the interaction population size
and the complexity of tools regardless of the region
where the hunter-gatherer society is located. The second
objection is technically correct but the conclusion they
make is not correct. Henrich et al. assume that because
the treadmill model posits a causal relationship between
the interaction population size and tool complexity, but
not between the census population size and cultural
complexity, no correlation is expected between the cen-
sus population size and tool complexity. However, their
conclusion requires that the census population size var-
ies randomly with respect to the interaction population
size, for if there is any positive correlation between the
two measures (regardless of causation), either both cor-
relate with tool complexity or neither correlates with
tool complexity. Although Henrich et al. discuss prob-
lems with the accuracy of census data for hunter-
gatherer groups in detail, they provide no data showing
that the census population size varies randomly with
respect to the interaction population size. Furthermore,
their argument ignores the fact that the interaction pop-
ulation size is a function of the population density.
Hence, the predicted correlation between the interac-
tion population size and tool complexity may be tested
by computing the correlation between tool complexity
and population density. When this comparison is made,
the correlation between the population density and tool
complexity is found to be zero (Read, 2006). In sum,
the predictions from the treadmill model are falsified
empirically by meta data sets on hunter-gatherer
groups.
10.3. Inuit of the Arctic region
Data on the Inuit of the Arctic region and the problems
these data pose for the treadmill model have been dis-
cussed extensively in the work by Read (2012b).
Briefly, the Inuit made some of the most complex tools
of any hunter-gatherer group. Within these data, the
Greenland Inuit data are especially problematic for the
treadmill model due to the Angmaksalik Inuit of east-
ern Greenland making a harpoon with 33 parts, the
most complex implement of any hunter-gatherer group
(Oswalt, 1976). The Angmaksalik Inuit had a popula-
tion size of 420 persons in the earliest census of
Greenland (Petersen, 1984, Table 2), an order of mag-
nitude smaller than the population of Tasmania that
was said by Henrich (2004, 2006) to be too small to
make simple bone points and clothing. With regard to
the maximum possible interaction population size of
Table 2. Tool complexity, contact between groups, and ocean currents.
Island group Mean TU Population size Contact Ocean currents (Ocean Current)*(Population Size)
Malekula 3.2 1100 1 1 1100
Chuuk 3.8 9200 2 1 9200
Santa Cruz 4.0 3600 1 2 7200
Trobriand 4.0 8000 2 2 16,000
Tikopia 4.7 1500 1 1 1500
Yap 5.0 4791 2 2 9542
Lau Fiji 5.0 7400 2 3 22,200
Tonga 5.4 17,500 2 2 35,000
Manus 6.6 13,000 1 3 39,000
TU: number of technical units. TU is defined as ‘‘an integrated, physically distinct and unique structural configuration that contributes to the form of
a finished artefact’’ (Oswalt, 1976, p. 38).Contact: Frequency of contact with other groups, 1 = low, 2 = high.Ocean currents: 1 = protected, 2 =
partially protected, 3 = not protected.Data on TUs, population size, and contact are from Kline and Boyd (2010).Data on ocean currents are from
Read (2012b; Appendix).
18 Adaptive Behavior
the Angmaksalik Inuit, the total population of Inuit in
Greenland was about 6000 persons; hence, even if all
the Inuit in Greenland interacted with one another,
despite groups being separated by hundreds of kilo-
meters of rugged coastline, the interaction population
size was at most about the same size as the interaction
population of Tasmania. More realistically, the
Angmaksalik Inuit would have had contact at most
with the Inuit on the southern coast of Greenland, but
the fact that their mtDNA haplotype frequencies dis-
tinguish them from the Inuit of southern Greenland
(Helgason et al., 2006) implies that drift was a more
important factor than migration in structuring their
mtDNA haplotype frequencies: ‘‘the current differences
indicate that drift has outweighed gene flow’’ (A.
Helgason, email communication, January 22, 2010).
Thus, there was little interaction between the east and
southern coast, let alone between Inuit on the east
coast and the west coast of Greenland. Yet, even if we
assume the interaction population included both the
east and the south coast Inuit, then we still have the
striking contradiction that even through there were
supposedly no target persons in Tasmania sufficiently
skilled to make simple bone points and clothing, the
Angmaksalik Inuit made a vastly more complex
implement—a harpoon with 33 parts—with at most the
same interaction population size. No counterargument
to the conclusions drawn from these Inuit data has yet
been published.
10.4. Oceania fishing hooks
In their study of the complexity of fishing hooks made
by groups on the Oceania Islands with a subsistence
economy, Kline and Boyd (2010) claim that the com-
plexity of their fishing hooks varies positively with the
interaction population size. However, close examina-
tion of their data and analysis, discussed in Read
(2012b), shows, for five reasons, that this is not the
case.
First, Kline and Boyd state, correctly, that each
group in their data set must have the same economic
basis, namely, a subsistence economy (M. A. Kline,
email communication, 7 December 2010). However,
Hawaii, one of the groups in their sample, had a barter,
not a subsistence, economy and had extensive fish
farms characterized as being comparable ‘‘to integrated
farming systems developed in ancient China and
Egypt’’ (Costa-Peirce, 1985, p. 328). When Hawaii is
removed from the data set, the correlation between
population size and tool complexity is not significant at
the 5% level (n = 9, r = .61, p = .08; Read, 2012b).
Next, to assess the relationship between the interaction
population size and the complexity of fish hooks, Kline
and Boyd (2010) measured whether groups that had a
high contact rate with other groups and groups that
had a low contact rate with other groups were
non-randomly distributed around the regression line
computed for population size used as a predictor of
tool complexity. The test for a random distribution was
not significant even at the 60% level (p = .64, Fisher
exact test); hence, groups with a high contact rate did
not have more complex tools than groups with a low
contact rate, contrary to the prediction from the tread-
mill model (Read, 2012b).
Second, they note that the treadmill model implies
that the relationship between tool complexity, mea-
sured by number of tool types, and population size
should be a concave curve, but is, in fact, linear, as can
be seen visually in Figure 9. It is clear from Figure 9
that Hawaii is a statistical outlier, thus, Hawaii violates
not only their criterion of only including groups with a
subsistence economy but is statistically an outlier in
comparison with the linear relationship between popu-
lation size and number of tool types that characterizes
the other n = 9 groups in their sample.
Third, their measure of risk is the frequency of
unusual weather events such as typhoons, whereas the
risk of concern in the risk hypothesis is the risk of fail-
ing to be successful on a food procurement episode,
not the risk associated with occasional extreme weather
events. Their failure to show a correlation between the
frequency of typhoons and fish hook complexity is not
a valid test of the risk hypothesis.
Fourth, their statistical analysis shows, for the
Oceania fishing data, that it is population size and not
the interaction population size that is a predictor of
tool complexity, contrary to the work by Henrich
(2004, 2006). In their regression analysis, the variables
used for predicting tool complexity include (1) popula-
tion size and (2) interaction population size. However,
once population size is included in their regression
model, interaction population size fails to be included
Figure 9. Linear relationship between population size and the
number of tool types for nine Oceania Islands (excluding
Hawaii). Triangles: groups with a high rate of contact with other
groups. Diamonds: groups with a low rate of contact with other
groups. Solid disk: Hawaii. Hawaii is an outlier.
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as well (Kline & Boyd, 2010). Hence, contrary to the
treadmill model, their analysis implies that population
size, not the interaction population size, is the predictor
of tool complexity. However, even this result is mis-
leading since Kline and Boyd did not include a relevant
risk variable in their analysis.
Fifth, and most critical, the risk of fishing as a daily
subsistence activity is primarily related to whether an
island is protected from daily ocean currents by coral
reefs or small islands, not the frequency of occasional
events such as typhoons, the risk measure used by Kline
and Boyd. The risk imposed by ocean currents to the
success of a fishing episode may be measured indirectly
by the extent to which an island is exposed to ocean
currents (see Table 2). When this measure of risk is
included in the regression analysis, the only variable sig-
nificantly predicting tool complexity (measured, follow-
ing Kline and Boyd (2010), by the mean TU value for
fishing gear for each group) is the degree of protection
from ocean currents (see Figure 10). The correlation, r
= .71, between ocean current and TU is significant at
the 5% level (p = .03; Read, 2012b). Thus, their data
show that the fishing hooks vary in complexity accord-
ing to fishing risk and not according to interaction pop-
ulation size or to population size. No counterargument
has yet been published with regard to the conclusions
derived in the work by Read (2012b) and summarized
here.
In addition, but not discussed in the work by Read
(2012b), although the correlation between population
size and tool complexity (r = .61) is not significant at
the 5% level (p = .08), that tool complexity may
increase with population size cannot be ruled out since
the power of the statistical test is not high due to the
small sample size (n = 9). These data, though, are
unlike the meta hunter-gatherer data where the correla-
tion between population size and tool complexity is
numerically almost identical to zero. This is not the case
here. It is possible, then, given the low power of the sta-
tistical test, that population size is relevant to tool com-
plexity for the two large groups, Tonga and Manus,
each with a population size an order of magnitude
greater than the population sizes for the other groups.
Both groups are in a higher risk environment, as mea-
sured by exposure to ocean currents, and each has
greater tool complexity than is the case for the other
oceanic groups (see Table 2). Furthermore, as with the
metadata, there is an interaction effect (discussed in the
work by Read (2008)) between the measure of risk,
ocean current, and population size that predicts tool
complexity. The correlation between mean TU and the
interaction effect ((Ocean Current)*(Population Size))
is r = .81, which is significant at the 1% level (p =
.0077; see Figure 11). This result is contrary to the
treadmill model as it does not involve the likelihood of
a more skillful person being present in a larger popula-
tion in comparison with a smaller population, but only
that negative effects from a high-risk environment are
more pronounced with a larger population than a
smaller one and the response to this interaction effect is
to make more complex implements to compensate for
Figure 10. Linear regression model between mean TU and
ocean current is significant at the 5% level.
Figure 11. Regression model between mean TU and the interaction effect—(Ocean Current)*(Population Size). The regression
model is significant at the 1% level.
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the combination of a risky environment and a large
population size (compare Santa Cruz with Tonga and
Lao Fiji with Manus in Table 2), as predicted by the
risk hypothesis.
11. Risk hypothesis
The risk hypothesis (Torrence, 1983, 1989, 2000) relat-
ing artifact design complexity by hunter-gatherers to
risk in food resource procurement has been widely cited
and accepted in the archeology literature. The hypoth-
esis is based on the fact that food resource procurement
carries risk in the sense that any episode of food pro-
curement may be unsuccessful, for a variety of reasons,
ranging from factors over which individuals have some
control to factors over which they have little or no con-
trol. Three of the factors that affect risk and are central
to the risk hypothesis are, first, the probability that a
food procurement episode will be successful; second,
the number of possible procurement episodes in each
yearly cycle; and third, the quantity of food procured
when a procurement episode is successful. These factors
determine whether the quantity of food resources that
can be obtained matches the need of a group for food
resources. Of these three factors, the maximum number
of possible food resource procurement episodes is
largely outside of the control of hunter-gatherers, the
quantity obtained is partially under their control
through choices made regarding which resource to pur-
sue, and the probability of a successful food procure-
ment episode once a resource is identified can be
modified directly by hunter-gatherers through the
design of the implements they make. The risk hypoth-
esis focuses on this last factor.
The maximum number of possible procurement epi-
sodes is (to a first approximation) proportional to the
length of the growing season since the growing season
demarcates the period of time over which food
resources are relatively abundant versus when they are
less abundant and so are harder to procure. The length
of the growing season varies from 365 days a year in
equatorial areas to a few days a year in the extreme
Arctic. The probability of a successful food procure-
ment episode can be increased by hunter-gatherers in a
number of ways, ranging from the knowledge they have
regarding the yearly pattern for the location of food
resources to actions taken by hunter-gatherers to
ensure that any attempt to procure a food resource is
successful, especially when procuring mobile resources
through hunting and/or fishing. It is here where the
complexity of implements used in the procurement of
food resources comes into play.
Any implement used to obtain an animal resource
depends upon completing subtasks such as how close
the hunter must get to the animal for an implement to
effectively wound, kill, or disable the animal being
hunted, the means for transferring energy from the hun-
ter to the implement, the accuracy with which an imple-
ment can strike or hit the hunted animal, the design of
that part of the implement which will penetrate into an
animal or otherwise disable the animal, and so on. For
implements composed of a single part, all of the sub-
tasks involved in procuring an animal through the use
of an implement must be done by the implement as a
whole; hence, a compromise will be necessary in the
design of that implement since the design effectiveness
with which each of these subtasks is carried out cannot
be maximized simultaneously. Increasing the number of
parts, with each part designed for better accomplishing
a subtask, makes it possible to optimize each part of the
implement for the subtask it will carry out.
That implements will be made with more parts
(hence, will be more complex when complexity is equa-
ted with number of parts) to reduce risk through
increasing the probability that a procurement episode
is successful is virtually self-evident. There is a cost, of
course, when making an implement with more parts.
The likelihood that this cost is counter-balanced by the
increased effectiveness of an implement made with sev-
eral parts should be inversely proportional to the length
of the growing season and proportional to the size of
the resource that can be obtained since the risk of not
obtaining enough food resources increases as the grow-
ing season gets shorter. This leads to the risk hypoth-
esis with its claim that the complexity of implements
should track risk, where risk may be measured by, for
example, the length of the growing season, or by some
other environmental measure relating to risk. The risk
hypothesis was tested successfully by Torrence (1989)
using latitude as a proxy measure for risk since climate
differences affecting the growing season are associated
with latitude.
Contrary to the risk hypothesis, the treadmill model
hypothesizes a demographic constraint on increase in
the complexity of implements derived both from the
statistical property that the expected number of individ-
uals in a population with a given skill level increases
with the population size and from an invalid assump-
tion used to translate this statistical property into a
driver for tool complexity. The treadmill model assumes
two parts to phenotype transmission through imitation:
first, degradation of the skill level of the target due to
imperfect imitation (see solid arrows in Figure 12) and
second, innovation that compensates for the degrada-
tion (see dashed arrows in Figure 12). If the compensa-
tion is greater than the degradation, the net result
would be an increase in the skill level over what is pro-
duced through imitation (see Figure 12, middle). For
this to occur, it must be assumed that the increase in
skill level through innovation is essentially independent
of the skill level of the target. According to this assump-
tion, if the target is an implement produced by the most
skilled individual, then the imitator, through
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innovation, will produce an implement with skill level
greater than the current maximum skill level in the pop-
ulation and the average skill level in the population
would increase. The assumption that the degree of
increase in the skill level through innovation is indepen-
dent of the target skill level is incorrect. It would imply
that if the imitator imitated the most skilled implement
that he or she can produce, then he or she will now pro-
duce an implement requiring a higher skill level, contra-
dicting the assumption that the target item is the most
skillfully crafted implement that the imitator can make.
Instead, the increase in skill level through innovation
decreases with the increase in the skill level of the target,
and the increase will, at most, be close to the amount of
degradation for a target produced by the most skilled
individual (see Figure 12, bottom).
The risk hypothesis assumes that most, if not all, the
implements made by hunter-gatherers can be made
with skill levels easily found in populations the size of a
hunter-gatherer residence group (see Table 1). Even the
most complex implements do not require skill levels
beyond, say, the 98th percentile of individual skill lev-
els, and there will be individuals with this skill level in a
hunter-gatherer group. Yet, the treadmill model
assumes the opposite. The treadmill model hypothe-
sizes that increased complexity is limited by the interac-
tion population size and even the task of making
simple clothing in Tasmania with simple points could
only be done effectively by the highest skill level found
in a population of 8000 interacting individuals and this
skill level would not likely be found in a group of 4000
interacting individuals. According to the treadmill
model, introducing more complex implements or tasks
would require increasing the size of the interaction pop-
ulation sufficiently so that there would now be an indi-
vidual with the skills needed to make even more
complex implements, while an individual with these
skills would not likely be found in the previous, smaller
interaction population.
The contrast between the implications of the tread-
mill hypothesis and the risk hypothesis for hunter-
gatherer groups is stark. The treadmill hypothesis
implies that we should find a clear and strong relation-
ship between the size of the interaction population and
the complexity of implements, whereas the risk hypoth-
esis implies that there should be no or little relationship
between the interaction population size and complexity.
Furthermore, the treadmill model is silent on the rela-
tionship between implement complexity and risk.
Instead, any correlation between risk and implement
complexity would require that there must be selection
for a larger interaction population as the means for
relating complexity to risk. Thus, the treadmill model
implies the structural model: risk! interaction popula-
tion size! implement complexity. Hence, the treadmill
model implies that the relationship between risk and
implement complexity must be attenuated by the inter-
action population size.
However, a detailed analysis (see Read, 2008) of the
relationship between risk (measured by the number of
growing months), implement complexity, frequency of
group movement by a hunter-gatherer group (also pos-
ited to be inversely related to implement complexity;
see Shott, 1986), and the collector versus forager strat-
egy for resource procurement proposed by Binford
(1980)—and still widely used by archeologists (Sutton,
2000)—does not show an attenuated effect between risk
and implement complexity, but instead shows precisely
the opposite. The analysis yields a regression model
(see Read, 2008 for details) that accounts for about
96% of the variability in implement complexity (see
Figure 13). In Read’s analysis, the hunter-gatherer
groups are the same as those used by Collard, Kemery
and Banks (2005) and Read (2006) (with the exception
that the Andamanese and Aranda hunter-gatherer
groups are not included as they are clear outliers; see
top part of Figure 5 in Read, 2008), and complexity is
Figure 12. Top: Chimpanzee with STWM = 3 (open disk)
imitates target (solid disk) nut cracking with a moderate skill
level. Solid arrow shows degradation of imitated skill level due
to imitation. Dashed arrow shows increase in the skill level of
imitator through emulation. Middle: Chimpanzee with STWM =
3 (open disk) imitates target from the previous round of
imitation nut cracking with a high level of skill. Solid arrow
shows degradation of imitated skill level due to imitation.
Dashed arrow shows increase in the skill level of imitator
through emulation under the assumption that increase in skill
due to emulation is independent of the target skill level
(Henrich, 2004). The chimpanzee with STWM = 3 achieves a
new, higher skill level under this assumption. Bottom:
Chimpanzee with STWM = 3 (open disk) imitates target from
the previous round of imitation nut cracking with a high level of
skill. Solid arrow shows degradation of imitated skill level due to
imitation. Dashed arrow shows increase in the skill level of
imitator through emulation under the assumption that increase
in skill due to emulation is inversely proportional to the target
skill level. The chimpanzee with STWM = 3 does not achieve a
new, higher skill level under this assumption.
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measured by TTS/STS, the average number of parts
per implement, which is the measure for implement
complexity used by other researchers.
Striking in Figure 13 is the statistical split in the data
set into two distinct clusters, each with a linear fit for
the regression of implement complexity (TTS/STS) on
the interaction effect between length of growing season
and mobility (GS*NMV). The upper cluster in Figure
13 is composed of nine hunter-gatherer groups, six with
a collector strategy; and the lower cluster is composed
of nine hunter-gatherer groups, six with a foraging
strategy. Of the 6 out of 18 mismatches between strat-
egy and cluster, the Chenchu are tropical foragers who
were becoming incipient agriculturalists (Binford, 1980)
and classified as collectors for this reason. Of the five
remaining groups, only one is not questionably
included in the wrong group (Read, 2008). With the
Chenchu correctly coded as foragers, the null hypoth-
esis that the groups are distributed around the regres-
sion lines independently of their classification as
foragers or collectors may be rejected at the a = 5%
significance level since p(xø 13) = .048 for a binomial
distribution with 18 trials and probability p = .5 of a
success, x.
The two clusters in Figure 13 are consistent with
Binford’s (1980) observation that a foraging strategy
uses mobility to track seasonal and spatial variation in
resource availability by mapping people to resources,
whereas a collector strategy averages out seasonal and
geographic variation in resource availability by map-
ping resources in a region to people. A foraging strat-
egy, then, tends to be less resource intensive than a
collector strategy since population growth is con-
strained by Liebig’s law of the minimum for resource
density for a forager strategy, whereas population
growth is constrained by the average resource density
for a collector strategy. This expected difference in the
strategies is supported by the demographic changes
that occurred in the Southern Plateau in Western
America after there was a shift from a forager to a col-
lector strategy for obtaining food resources. Starting
about 3500 BP, there was a rapid shift in the Southern
Plateau from a mobile, forager strategy to a collector
strategy that was then followed by an exponential rate
of population growth until about 3000 BP (Chatters,
1995).
A collector strategy, by averaging over spatial and
temporal variability in food resources, can maintain a
higher population density, but since this also depends
on more intensive resource exploitation as population
density increases, it follows, according to the risk
hypothesis, that implement assemblages will be more
complex for collector hunter-gatherer groups under the
same conditions as a forager hunter-gatherer group. As
can be seen in Figure 13, for a given value of
GS*NMV, groups with a collector strategy have more
complex tools, as predicted from the risk hypothesis
but not from the treadmill model. According to the
treadmill model, more complex implements and modes
of resource procurement will correspond to larger inter-
action population sizes, hence to higher population
densities, since population density is a proxy for the
interaction population size.
With regard to claims that Tasmania had unusually
simple implements for a hunter-gatherer group (e.g.
Diamond, 1978; Jones, 1977 ; Oswalt, 1976), it can be
seen visually in Figure 13 that Tasmania, despite its
simple tools for resource exploitation, is not out of line
with other hunter-gatherer groups but is on the regres-
sion line for a forager strategy. The simplicity of their
implements and the loss of bone points, though used by
Henrich (2004) as an index of a maladaptive change dri-
ven by an externally imposed reduction in their interac-
tion population size, can be more plausibly accounted
for by their mobility in combination with the length of
the growing season in Tasmania, and by no longer
needing bone points to make simple garments as protec-
tion against the cold when the last ice age ended with
global warming in the early Holocene, beginning from
11,700 BP.
That 96% of the variability in the complexity of
implements is accounted for by the regression model
implies that either the treadmill model must account
for the risk model or, if it is independent of the risk
model, it accounts for at most 4% of the variability in
the complexity of implements. Since the interaction
Figure 13. Upper regression line: linear model for the
collector strategy. Triangles (from left to right): Angmaksalik
Inuit, Inglulik Inuit, Tareumiut Inuit, Tanaina, Ingalik, Twana,
Nabesna, Ingura, Tiwi. Lower regression line: linear model for
the forager strategy. Squares (from left to right): Owens Valley
Paiute, Copper Inuit, Tlingit, Nharo, Klamath, Caribou Inuit,
Chenchu, Surprise Valley Paiute, Tasmania. GS: growth season;
NMV: number of annual moves; TTS: total number of
technounits—elaborateness; STS: total number of subsistants—
diversity.
Source: STS, TTS data are from Oswalt (1976); GS, NMV data
from Binford (2001): Tables 4.01, 4.07, and 5.01.
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population size does not correlate with implement com-
plexity and the interaction population size is the driving
factor in the treadmill model, it follows that the two
models are independent and so the treadmill model
accounts for, at most, 4% of the variability in the com-
plexity of implements for this data set, thus relegating
the treadmill model to a virtually non-existent role
when modeling the causal basis of implement complex-
ity in hunter-gatherer societies.
12. Conclusion
In this article, we have reviewed some of the issues
stemming from current models regarding the drivers of
cultural complexity and cultural evolution. Our concern
has not been with the form of the models but with
assumptions inherent to their implementation, espe-
cially for the small-scale, hunter-gatherer societies that
typified the evolution of Homo sapiens prior to the
Holocene. In particular, we have taken issue with the
implementation of what is colloquially referred to as a
treadmill model in which a demographic factor, the
interaction population size, is asserted to be the driver
of cultural complexity through the DIT model of evolu-
tion. The DIT model integrates genotypic and phenoty-
pic transmission of traits, with the former central to
evolution in the biological domain and the latter to evo-
lution in the cultural domain. However, cultural evolu-
tion, as it is implemented in the DIT model, depends on
defining cultural traits by reference to just the transmis-
sion part of Tylor’s seminal definition of culture as a
‘‘complex whole.’’ In so doing, the DIT model redefines
traditions as cultural traits, thereby losing sight of the
way that what constitutes culture involves far more
than just the mode of transmission. We claim that DIT
thereby becomes the proverbial street light under which
a search is conducted for something that likely lies out-
side the area of illumination.
Culture has to do with shared idea systems and their
transmission. Traditions and their transmission are, of
course, of central importance for understanding cul-
ture, but it is only part of the issue, and a major draw-
back of DIT is that it is predisposed to reducing culture
to a collection of traditions. Culture, in the full sense of
the term, means that cultural evolution operates at the
organizational and not at the population level assumed
in the DIT model of evolution (Lane et al., 2009).
The DIT simplification of culture also predisposes us
to accept the convenient idea that artifacts may be taken
as the substance of cultural evolution. This runs counter
to the arguments of archeologists regarding material
culture as the instantiated consequence of cultural idea
systems. Culture has to do directly with shared idea sys-
tems, and only indirectly with artifacts as the instantia-
tion of those shared idea systems (Read, 2007a).
For artifacts, cultural complexity needs to be related to
the cultural idea systems that guide their production and
use, and not just to the intrinsic complexity of tools mea-
sured, for example, by counting the number of parts. The
latter, by itself, leads to anomalies such as the conclusion
that a termite stick made by a chimpanzee and a hand axe
made by Homo erectus are equally complex since both are
implements consisting of a single part. The number of
parts does relate to complexity when considering how
implements are made with multiple parts so that each part
can be optimized for a particular function in the use of
that implement. Thus, a termite stick and a hand axe are
equally complex with regard to the way each is designed
to do a task without subdividing the implement into parts
designed to do a single function within the overall task. At
a different analytical level, when we consider the idea sys-
tems involved in the production of a hand axe in compari-
son with that of a termite stick, the far greater complexity
of the idea system involved in making of a hand axe in
comparison with making a termite stick comes to the fore
(compare Figures 2 and 3).
The treadmill model has been very influential in cul-
tural evolutionary thinking about cultural complexity
and its causes. It attempts, through a mathematical
model, to reduce all of this, using the framework of the
DIT model of evolution, to the statistical fact that the
highest skill level found in a large population is likely to
be greater than the highest skill level found in a small
population. The model ignores the other statistical
observation that a skill level likely to be found in a large
population and simultaneously not likely to be found in
a small population (i.e. the skill level needed to satisfy
the condition posited by the treadmill model for an
increase in average skill level) requires that the skill level
be in at least the (1 2 1/nlarge)*100 percentile, and that
nsmall \ nlarge/2, where nlarge and nsmall are the sizes of
the large and the small populations, respectively. For
populations with nlarge ø 100, the skill level must
already be in the 99th percentile, and the percentile for
the skill level increases rapidly to implausible levels as
the population size increases.
For the case of Tasmania, where it is claimed that indi-
viduals sufficiently skilled to carry out the task of making
clothing using bone points would be found in a popula-
tion of 8000 persons but would unlikely be found in a
population of 4000 persons, the skill level would have to
at least be in the 99.9875th percentile of skill levels for this
to occur, yet the task in question is that of making simple
clothing using an easily made bone tool. The treadmill
phenomenon occurs, then, if at all, only for small popula-
tions of tens of individuals at the most, and the only sce-
nario where we could imagine that there would be small
populations of individuals each with a specific skill would
be sedentary communities with craft specialization in
which a few artisans produce artifacts of a particular kind
that are then distributed, by various means, to other group
members.
The treadmill model implies that implements more
complex than, for example, a bone point require even
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greater skills for their invention and for their imple-
mentation. These greater skills would only be found in
yet far larger populations, according to the treadmill
model; hence, as we go from simple tools consisting of
a single part to complex tools such as the harpoon with
33 parts made by the Inuit of eastern Greenland, the
population size required to produce complex imple-
ments would quickly be vastly larger than the total
number of hunter-gatherers in a geographic region, as
the complexity of implements increased. Not surpris-
ingly, the empirical data on hunter-gatherer tool com-
plexity has correlation neither with the census
population size nor with the interaction population
size. Thus, the prediction of the treadmill model that
tool complexity is driven by increase in population
density—which is a proxy measure for the interaction
population size—is not supported empirically.
If anything, anthropological and ecological theoriz-
ing suggests that cultural complexity generates high
population density rather than the other way around.
There is likely such an effect playing out across time,
but it is not a social effect per se and it has to do with
population pressure (Keeley, 1988), that is, to the eco-
logical relation between the group and its environment
and the competition between groups utilizing overlap-
ping territories for resource procurement and/or
resource production. Increase in complexity of imple-
ments through investment in technology points to an
increase in the intensity with which local resources are
procured and utilized. This may lead to replacement of
neighboring low-complexity, low–density, and area-
demanding groups. Alternatively, neighboring groups
may develop more complex technology that allows
them to tap into new and/or marginal resources (Read,
1987). The Broad-Spectrum Revolution (Flannery,
1969; Stiner, 2001 ; Stiner, Munro, & Surovell, 2000)
exemplifies this process.
Our argument does not, however, deny that there are
conditions under which increased technological com-
plexity is dependent upon increased population size,
just that this does not occur in the manner expressed in
the treadmill model. The conditions relating increase in
population size to technological complexity occur when
the support system required for implementation of the
more complex technological system requires a larger
population, not necessarily because what is produced
through the technology is complex, but because there
are more subgoals that must first be implemented for
the technology, itself, to be implemented and this
requires more persons than are available in a smaller
population. Situations like this arise with division of
labor for implementation of the subgoals involve in
technological production, ranging from resource pro-
curement to systems of distribution, and are magnified
with intensification of production. Conditions like this,
however, do not occur in small hunter-gatherer
societies.
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